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Asylum and Withholding of Deportation-
Challenges to the Alien After the
Refugee Act of 1980
ELWIN GRIFFITH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Every year many aliens seek admission to the United States as
visitors,' but admission may be denied through exclusion proceed-
ings. 2 After admission as a visitor, an alien may be deported if he
overstays his visit in the United States. 3 Whether he undergoes exclu-
sion or deportation proceedings, an alien still may seek relief by ap-
plying for asylum. 4 However, the alien does not have to wait for
* Professor of Law, Florida State University, College of Law, Tallahassee, Florida.
1. Visitors are known as nonimmigrants. Every alien who wants to come to the United
States is regarded as an immigrant unless he falls within one of the nonimmigrant classes set
out in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1988). There are several
classifications of nonimmigrants. Id. § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (1988). For exam-
ple, some nonimmigrants may come for short stays as visitors for business or pleasure. Id.
§ 101(a)(15)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)( B) (1988). During the 1987 fiscal year, 12,272,000
nonimmigrants were admitted, among whom were 8,887,000 visitors for pleasure. 1987 STA-
TISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 68 [hereinafter
1987 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK].
2. There are thirty-three classes of excludable aliens. Immigration & Nationality Act
§ 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1988). If an immigration officer does not believe that an alien
(with certain exceptions) is entitled beyond a doubt to land, the officer will usually detain the
alien for a hearing before an immigration judge. Id. § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1988). The
alien must be advised of his right to counsel at no expense to the government, and of the free
legal services programs. 8 C.F.R. § 235.6 (1989).
3. There are twenty classes of deportable aliens. Immigration & Nationality Act
§ 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988). If an alien is in the United States illegally or violates his
nonimmigrant status, he is subject to deportation. Id. § 241(a)(2), (9), 8 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(2),
(9) (1988).
4. An asylum applicant must be physically present in the United States or at a port of
entry. Id. § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988). In addition, any alien who applies for asylum
must qualify as a refugee. Id. Refugee is defined as "any person who is outside any country of
such person's nationality." Id. § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1988). Asylum
applicants must have "a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Id. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") received 26,107 applications for political asylum during the
1987 fiscal year and 99,408 applications were pending at the beginning of that year. The INS
granted asylum during the same period to 5,093 aliens. 1987 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK,
supra note i, at 58. These data do not cover aliens who were apprehended by the INS for
immigration violations.
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exclusion or deportation proceedings before applying for asylum. The
alien may apply immediately upon arrival or after being admitted to
the United States as a lawful visitor.
If an alien applies for asylum during exclusion or deportation
proceedings, his application is treated as an application for withhold-
ing of deportation under section 243(h) of the Immigration and Na-Ad._ _l' _ /6{TlbT A 9,\ I 11 . 1 1 1 . , ,tuonalltty Act 1111S pIOVIS01SUSL1 1C1SUPFU11
L1U1W1~ -~A;Li~ 1*4i.j.-Ths pov~~u s~ystile aiten s uepurtattois
once the Attorney General of the United States determines that the
alien's life or freedom would be threatened if the alien returned to his
country.
6
This concept of asylum relief developed slowly. Its underlying
rationale focused on protecting those aliens who had fallen out of
favor with their home government. It became available as early as
1875, when Congress created an exception for political offenders in an
exclusion statute.7 The trend continued in 1950, when Congress en-
acted a provision to prevent the deportation of an alien to any country
in which the alien would be physically persecuted.8
Furthermore, the INA refined the 1950 provision by making the
remedy discretionary with the Attorney General.9 The Supreme
Court applied this new provision to deportation proceedings only,'0
while the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") had to use
its parole power to grant relief to aliens in exclusion proceedings."
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988). After an alien is involved in deportation proceedings, he
may file an asylum application with the immigration judge. Such an application is also re-
garded as an application for withholding deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1989).
6. Section 243(h) provides as follows:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien (other than an alien de-
scribed in section 1251 (a)(19) of this title) to a country if the Attorney General deter-
mines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.
Immigration & Nationality Act § 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988).
7. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477.
8. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 23, 64 Stat. 987, 1010.
9. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, ch. 477, § 243(h), 66 Stat.
163, 214.
10. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
11. Parole was a purely administrative mechanism of the INS until Congress recognized
it statutorily in the INA. Immigration & Nationality Act § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) (1988). This section allows the Attorney General in his discretion to parole
aliens into the United States "for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public
interest." Id. The executive branch used the parole device to allow certain aliens to come into
the United States, including refugees, when the existing INA provisions did not accommodate
them. The Refugee Act added a provision which prevented the parole of refugees except in
individual cases of compelling public interest. Id. § 212(d)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(B)
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The INA amendments of 1965 introduced some relief for over-
seas refugees who, because of persecution or fear of persecution, fled
Communist countries or countries within the general area of the Mid-
dle East. 1 2 These aliens were admitted as conditional entrants, rather
than immigrants, with the expectation that they would later receive
permanent residence.13 However, no statutory mechanism existed for
aliens who wished to apply for asylum from within the United States.
In 1968, the United States took another step in developing asy-
lum-type relief by ratifying the United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees ("Protocol"). 14 In so doing, the United States
became bound to articles 2 through 34 of the United Nations Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees ("Convention"). 15 Congress
made no move at that time to amend the immigration laws, because it
believed that the United States could fulfill its responsibilities under
the Protocol without any statutory changes. 16 This reasoning was,
perhaps, overly optimistic because INA section 243(h) conflicted with
article 33 of the Convention. Article 33 made it mandatory rather
than discretionary for a state to withhold deportation of a refugee to a
place where that refugee would be persecuted. 17 Given this conflict,
the United States had to review its own legislation, not only to ex-
(1988). See also T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 639
(1985).
12. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, 79 Stat. 911, 913, amending Immigra-
tion & Nationality Act § 203(a)(7).
13. Id. Falling within the seventh-preference category of the immigration scheme, these
conditional entrants were usually eligible for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resi-
dence two years after entry. Id. The Refugee Act of 1980 completely overhauled the refugee
system and removed the seventh-preference conditional category. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 86-212, 94 Stat. 102.
14. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol].
15. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6259, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Convention]. The United
States is bound by the Convention because article I(1) of the Protocol incorporates articles 2
through 34 of the Convention.
16. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984). The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")
was confident that the Attorney General would use his discretion under section 243(h) in a
way that was consistent with the treaty. See Matter of Dunar, 14 1. & N. Dec. 310, 322 (1973).
See also D. MARTIN, MAJOR ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION LAW 79 (1987); Anker, Discretionary
Asylum: A Protection Remedyfor Refugees Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 28 VA. J. INT'L L.
1, 33 & n.162 (1987).
17. Article 33 of the Convention prohibits the return of a "refugee in any manner what-
soever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account
of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion."
Convention, supra note 15, art. 33(1). Section 243(h) of the INA protects an "alien." There-
fore, any alien in the United States is entitled to have his deportation withheld if he meets the
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amine the discretionary element of section 243(h), but also to consider
enacting some provision that recognized the alien's interest in remain-
ing in the United States indefinitely.
In 1980, Congress passed the Refugee Act,18 which affected both
asylum and withholding of deportation. Congress added a new provi-
sion that set up a statutory framework under which aliens could apply
for asylum. 3 Previously, an alien's eligibility for asylum rested on
administrative regulations rather than congressional statutes. 20 It be-
came clear that an alien who qualified as a refugee2' and was in the
United States, at the border or at a port of entry, would be eligible, at
the Attorney General's discretion, for status as an "asylee.
' '22
Section 243(h) also underwent change. 23 Since that section pro-
vided only discretionary relief prior to the Refugee Act, it was neces-
sary to bring the statute in line with the mandatory provision in the
Convention. Section 243(h) survived in the statutory scheme because
Congress wanted to respect the "nonrefoulement" provisions of the
Convention,24 while at the same time providing some mechanism for
appropriate standards. The alien does not have to qualify as a refugee. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S.
407, 422 (1984).
18. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 86-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.).
19. Immigration & Nationality Act § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1988).
20. Before 1974 there was no provision specifically authorizing asylum. Anyone in the
United States applying for asylum had to rely on the Attorney General's parole power. See
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 427 & n.4 (1987). The 1974 regulation created a
system under which aliens in the United States could apply for relief. The alien had to apply
to the district director who had jurisdiction over the alien's place of residence in the United
States. See 8 C.F.R. pt. 108 (1975). The Refugee Act of 1980 was the first statute to spell out
an alien's right to apply for political asylum. Anker, supra note 16, at 33 & n. 163. See also
Blum, The Ninth Circuit and the Protection of Asylum Seekers Since the Passage of the Refugee
Act of 1980, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 327, 330 & n. 14 (1986); Note, Political Bias in the United
States Refugee Policy Since the Refugee Act of 1980, 1 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 495, 517 (1986).
21. A refugee must have a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Immigration &
Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(B), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(B) (1988).
22. Id. § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988). The INS is required to interview the "asylee"
annually to determine continued eligibility. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(e)(i) (1989).
23. The Refugee Act of 1980 made withholding of deportation mandatory instead of dis-
cretionary once the alien could show that he met the requirements. The Act also required the
Attorney General to determine that "such alien's life or freedom would be threatened," replac-
ing the previous language that the alien "would be subject to persecution" and the grounds for
persecution were expanded to include "nationality" and "membership in a particular group."
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (amending Immigration
& Nationality Act § 243(h)).
24. Article 33.1 of the Convention provides that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or
return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his
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true asylum status under section 208.
While section 243(h) prevents the INS from returning an alien to
a country where his life or freedom would be threatened, nothing pre-
vents the INS from sending that alien to another safe country because
section 243(h) does not intend to confer permanent residence status.2 5
Alternatively, once the Attorney General grants the alien asylum, the
alien can qualify for permanent residence after one year.26
Since section 208 relief is discretionary and section 243(h) relief
is now mandatory, an alien may sometimes obtain relief under one
section, but not the other.27 However, the alien's eligibility for either
remedy will depend in large measure on his ability to meet the appli-
cable standard of proof. Although the United States Supreme Court
recently settled the disagreement among the circuits about the stan-
dard of proof to be applied to each form of relief,28 there is still some
question as to how the standards will be applied to particular facts.
Disagreement also exists regarding what factors qualify an alien for
relief. This article will examine these issues to determine how the
Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") 29 and the courts have treated
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group, or political opinion." Convention, supra note 15, art. 33.1.
25. The Attorney General cannot return the alien "to a country if the Attorney General
determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country." Immigra-
tion & Nationality Act § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988) (emphasis added). But there is no
prohibition on returning the alien to another country which will accept him. In Matter of
Salim, the BIA prevented the alien's deportation to Afghanistan but did not see any problem
with sending the alien to "Pakistan or any other hospitable country ... if that country will
accept him." 18 I. & N. Dec. 311, 315 (1982).
26. An asylee has the right to apply for lawful permanent residence. If granted, the
asylee's lawful permanent residence is recorded as beginning one year prior to the application's
approval date. 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(f) (1989).
27. Compare Immigration & Nationality Act § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988), pro-
viding for mandatory withholding, with Immigration & Nationality Act § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158
(1988), providing for asylum at the Attorney General's discretion.
28. In INS v. Stevic, the Supreme Court held that an alien must show a clear probability
of persecution to be eligible for withholding of deportation, thus introducing a "more likely
than not" standard. 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984). In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court did
not indicate a specific standard for asylum, but left no doubt that an alien who has a well-
founded fear does not have to show a clear probability of persecution, thus making the alien's
burden slightly less than that in Stevic. 480 U.S. 421, 448-49 (1987). Prior to Cardoza-Fonseca
there was a conflict among the circuits. See, e.g., Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.
1986); Sankar v. INS, 757 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1985); Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562 (7th
Cir. 1984).
29. The BIA is in the Department of Justice and is supervised by the Director of the
Executive Office for Immigration Review. The Board consists of a chairman and four other
members. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(l) (1989). An appeal to the BIA may be taken from an immigra-
tion judge's decision denying an alien relief in an exclusion or deportation proceeding. 8
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aliens who have sought relief since the Refugee Act of 1980. Further,
it suggests that there is still room for statutory clarification.
II. THE STATUTORY CHALLENGE
A. The Applicable Standards
A controversial issue in asylum and withholding of deportation
cases concerns the applicable standard of proof. Before the United
States acceded to the Protocol in 1968, the law seemed clear that an
alien had to show a clear probability of persecution to withhold his
deportation under section 243(h).30 Initially, the Protocol did not ap-
pear to change existing U.S. law.
31
Soon after the United States' accession to the Protocol, the BIA
dealt with this question of proof in In re Dunar.32 In that case, the
alien asserted that he deserved to have his deportation withheld if he
showed a well-founded fear of persecution. However, the BIA upheld
the "clear probability of persecution" standard of section 243(h),
since it had received wide judicial support and nothing indicated that
the United States' accession to the Protocol intended to change that
approach.
33
The confusion surrounding the relationship between "well-
founded fear" and the "clear probability" standard continued as some
courts either used the terms interchangeably or suggested that the
standards would converge in practice. 34 Although the Refugee Act
retained section 243(h) of the INA, the new section 208 made it possi-
ble for an alien to obtain asylum if he possessed a well-founded fear of
persecution. Eventually, an explanation of the difference between
these two sections emerged.
C.F.R. § 301(b)(l)-(2) (1989). Judicial review of exclusion decisions is available in a habeas
corpus proceeding in federal district court, while review of deportation decisions is available in
the court of appeals. Immigration & Nationality Act § 106(a)-(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)-(b)
(1988).
30. See Matter of Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (1973); T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN,
supra note 11, at 640.
31. See Stevic, 467 U.S. at 417 (1983) (citing S. EXEC. REP. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968)).
32. 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (1973).
33. Id. at 318-19.
34. See, e.g., Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1978) (probable political per-
secution not proved); Martineau v. INS, 556 F.2d 306, 307 (5th Cir. 1977) ("clear probability"
of persecution); Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1977) (well-founded fear con-
verges with clear probability standard); Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194, 200 (5th Cir. 1975) (aliens
did not prove that they had well-founded fear of political persecution).
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In 1984, the Supreme Court solved the first part of the puzzle in
INS v. Stevic 35 when it decided that, under section 243(h), the alien
had to abide by a "clear probability" standard and show that it was
"more likely than not" that he would be persecuted on one of the
statutorily enumerated grounds.36 The Court rejected the Second Cir-
cuit's interpretation that "every alien who qualifie[d] as a 'refugee'...
[was] also entitled to a withholding of deportation under [section]
243(h)."' 37 The Court noted that Congress, by developing a complete
statutory scheme for the admission and resettlement of refugees, did
not intend asylum relief to displace the section 243(h) remedy.38
Since section 243(h) contains no language referring to refugees or the
"well-founded fear" standard of asylum relief, the alien in Stevic had
difficulty convincing the Court that the section 243(h) standard
should be anything less than "clear probability.
'3 9
Eventually the Court could not avoid answering the question it
had dodged in Stevic. In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,4° the Court held
that the "well-founded fear" standard of proof should apply in asylum
proceedings. Since the standard is more generous than the "clear
probability" standard, the alien's burden of proof is easier to meet in
asylum cases.
The Court first observed that the Refugee Act had introduced a
definition of "refugee" that required an alien to possess a well-
founded fear of persecution. 4' The Act had also amended section
243(h), but had not attempted to convert the "withholding" statute
into anything approximating the language in section 208.42 There-
fore, in this case, section 208 did not require the alien to prove that he
would be persecuted. The only issue was one of the alien's fear. The
Court emphasized that the fear requirement highlighted the subjective
nature of the asylum standard. 43 However, the Court noted that the
standard also contained an objective ingredient, as the fear had to
35. 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
36. Id. at 429-30. The Court specifically avoided defining the term "well-founded fear of
persecution," leaving that issue to another day.
37. Id. at 428.
38. S. REP. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980).
39. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 422.
40. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
41. Id. at 428.
42. Id. at 430.
43. Id. at 430-31. The BIA had previously agreed in Matter of Acosta that the term
"fear" referred to a subjective determination of the alien's mental state. Int. Dec. No. 2986, at
14 (BIA 1985).
1990]
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possess a stable foundation.44 The Court did not see how a bona fide,
subjective fear based on objective factors could require the "more
likely than not" standard of Stevic.
The Cardoza-Fonseca Court considered the historical back-
ground of the "well-founded fear" standard. The Protocol had incor-
porated the definition of "well-founded fear" contained in the
Constitution of the International Refugee Organization. 45 This defini-
tion functioned well if the alien's fear rested on reasonable grounds.
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
also supported the approach in its Handbook, which recognizes an
alien's fear as well-founded if the alien can show to a "reasonable de-
gree" that it would be intolerable for him to return to his country.46
Congress clearly wanted to conform its own definition of "refugee" to
the Protocol's.
47
The INS worried that the asylum provision would be perceived
as granting greater benefits because of its more liberal standard. 48
The Cardoza-Fonseca Court answered that concern by reminding the
INS that asylum was at the Attorney General's discretion, while with-
44. In his concurring opinion in Cardoza-Fonseca, Justice Blackmun stated that "the very
language of the term 'well-founded fear' demands a particular type of analysis-an examina-
tion of the subjective feelings of an applicant for asylum coupled with an inquiry into the
objective nature of the articulated reasons for the fear." 480 U.S. at 450.
45. The United Nations established the International Refugee Organization ("IRO") in
1946 to deal with the refugee problem arising at the end of the Second World War. It com-
pleted its work in 1952. The IRO constitution included as refugees those persons who ex-
pressed valid objections to returning to their country of nationality or former residence.
Among the objections considered valid were those based on "persecution because of race, reli-
gion, nationality or political opinion." International Refugee Organization Constitution, An-
nex 1, Sec. C, art. l(a)(i), 62 Stat. 3037, 3050. See also G. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1983); 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 136 (1966); Cox, "Well-Founded Fear of Being Persecuted": The Sources
and Application of a Criterion of Refugee Status, 10 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 333, 337-39 (1984).
46. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HAND-
BOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 12-13 (1979)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK]. The Handbook does not have the force of law, but it is helpful in
construing the Protocol, and courts have looked to it for guidance. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987).
47. Congress specifically incorporated the United Nations definition of refugee in its stat-
ute. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 160. With respect to withholding of deportation, Congress enacted
the section 243(h) amendment with the understanding that "it [was] based directly upon the
language of the Protocol and it [was] intended that the provision be construed consistent with
the Protocol." Id. at 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 161. See
also Helton, Political Asylum Under The 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 MICH.
J. L. REF. 243, 251 (1984).
48. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 443.
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holding of deportation was mandatory once it was determined that
deportation would threaten the alien's life or freedom.49 Therefore,
even if an alien possessed a well-founded fear of persecution, the alien
had no assurance of relief 50 as the Attorney General still had to exer-
cise his discretion.
If any doubt remained about the statutory differences, Congress'
amendment of section 243(h) in 1980 dispelled them. Some aliens
may find the lower threshold unappealing because it does not guaran-
tee asylum. However, achieving the "more likely than not" standard
gives the alien the certainty of temporary relief under section 243(h),
not merely the possibility of permanent relief under section 208.
Arguably, the mathematical formulation of the "well-founded
fear" standard is what unsettled the INS in Cardoza-Fonseca. The
Stevic formula required evidence that the alien would more likely than
not undergo persecution on one of the statutorily specified grounds.51
However, the Cardoza-Fonseca Court believed that an alien could
possess a well-founded fear even when "there [was] less than a 50%
chance of the occurrence taking place."'5 2 This proposition might
have caused the BIA discomfort, because in Matter of Acosta the BIA
had already signalled its dependence on such terms as "likelihood" or
"probability" of persecution.53  The BIA preferred a qualitative,
rather than a quantitative, assessment of the available evidence. 54 The
49. Id.
50. Id. In Matter of Salim, the BIA found that the alien was eligible for both asylum and
withholding but denied him asylum by exercising its discretion. 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (1982).
Matter of Pula modified Salim somewhat by holding that an alien's manner of entry was only
one factor to be considered in evaluating an asylum application. Int. Dec. No. 3033, at 9 (BIA
1987). In Matter of Salim, the BIA placed undue emphasis on the alien's fraudulent entry.
51. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984).
52. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987). The Court made the point by
referring to Grahl-Madsen's example that if every tenth male person in a country is either
killed or sent to a labor camp, then any alien male from that country would have a well-
founded fear of persecution. Id. See A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 45, at 180.
In R v. Secretary of State, 1 All E.R. 193 (1988), the House of Lords decided that in order
for an alien to show a well-founded fear of persecution, the alien must demonstrate a reason-
able degree of likelihood that he would be persecuted. Id. at 193. The decision-maker can take
into account not only facts known to him, but also facts unknown to the alien in order to
justify the objective basis for the fear. Id. The United Kingdom had acceded to the Conven-
tion and Protocol and, in his opinion, Lord Goff said that the term "well-founded" must re-
quire that "an inquiry should be made whether the subjective fear of the applicant is
objectively justified." Id. at 202. However, he was unable to agree with the court below that
the test for a well-founded fear under article 1(a)(2) and the test for non-refoulement under
article 33(1) of the Convention were different. Id. at 202-03.
53. Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. No. 2986, at 22 (BIA 1985).
54. Id. at 25.
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"likelihood" language closely resembled the "more likely than not"
standard in Stevic. In the BIA's view, this similarity argued
powerfully for the convergence of the standards. 55
One wonders whether this "realistic likelihood" test appealed to
the BIA because it avoided the necessity of distinguishing the objec-
tive features of sections 208 and 243(h). In practice, courts will nor-
mally defer to the expertise of the agency which oversees the
administration of a statute, but that deference should arise only when
the proper standard has been agreed upon. 56 Therefore, the Cardoza-
Fonseca Court did not deny the INS its rightful zone of influence.
The INS was still expected to assess the alien's evidence to see
whether this evidence met the required standard. The INS stood on
shaky ground in denying the existence of two different standards, sim-
ply because an alien might qualify, in many cases, for relief under
both sections. In essence, this is the function of the INS. The INS
must determine if the alien's particular situation meets the statutory
requirements for relief.
The BIA's conclusion in Acosta that the standards for asylum
and withholding of deportation "[were] not meaningfully different
and, in practical application converge[d] ' '15 did not mean that the
standards were the same. Applying the standards may have presented
difficulty, but even the BIA could not categorically state that the two
sections called for identical treatment.
The BIA created difficulty for the courts through its failure to
recognize the differing standards. For example, in Vides-Vides v.
INS,58 the Ninth Circuit dealt with the BIA's perplexing language
that the alien did not possess a well-founded fear of persecution re-
gardless of whether the alien's claim of persecution was based on a
" 'clear probability,' " a "'reasonable probability,' " or a " 'good rea-
son to fear.' 59 Although the BIA never explicitly stated that the
asylum standard was more liberal, the court examined the BIA's deci-
sion in its entirety to determine whether the BIA had in fact acknowl-
55. In Acosta, the BIA stated: "We find no meaningful distinction between a standard
requiring a showing that persecution is likely to occur and a standard requiring a showing that
a persecution is more likely than not to occur." Id. at 25. The BIA then concluded that "the
standards for asylum and withholding of deportation are not meaningfully different, and in
practical application, converge." Id.
56. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987).
57. Acosta, Int. Dec. No. 2986, at 2.
58. 783 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1986).
59. Id. at 1468 (quoting from the BIA's opinion).
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edged the difference in the standards. Fortunately, the BIA had held
that the alien was not eligible for withholding of deportation because
he did not show a "clear probability of persecution. '"60 The BIA fur-
ther held that the alien could not receive asylum because he did not
show a "well-founded fear of persecution."' 6 1 These findings satisfied
the court that the BIA's language denying the alien asylum did not
reflect a misunderstanding of the applicable standard. 62
However, after the BIA's decision in Acosta, courts became
somewhat more concerned about the BIA's imprecise language. The
courts found themselves under pressure to demand an explicit state-
ment from the BIA that a more generous standard applied in asylum
cases. In Sanchez- Trujillo v. INS,63 the BIA's occasional use of the
terms "will be" and "would be" in its assessment of the alien's asylum
claim did not overly upset the Ninth Circuit because the BIA ex-
pressly accepted that court's holding in Cardoza-Fonseca that the asy-
lum standard was more generous. 64 The court forgave the BIA's
imprecise language since, in the court's reasoning, the BIA merely
wanted to emphasize the requirement of an objective basis for an
alien's well-founded fear.
65
Further clarifying its position in Rodriguez v. INS,66 the Ninth
Circuit required the BIA to state clearly in post-Acosta cases that the
BIA was applying the more generous standard to asylum decisions. 67
The court took this position because the BIA had adhered to its
Acosta position and had used the language of the "clear probability"
test in assessing the alien's asylum claim. 68 Therefore, the court
deemed it unacceptable for the BIA to use the same general boiler-
60. Id.
61. Id. The court was not upset by the BIA's failure to state explicitly that the asylum
standard was more liberal. It was more concerned with the BIA's actual analysis. Id.
62. The court was not interested in the "utterance of certain magic words by the BIA."
Id. It looked at the BIA opinion as a whole to determine whether the BIA understood the two
different standards. This BIA opinion in Vides-Vides pre-dated Acosta, where the BIA took
the position that no mearfingful difference in the standards existed. Matter of Acosta, Int.
Dec. No. 2986 (BIA 1985).
63. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
64. Id. at 1578.
65. Id. at 1579.
66. 841 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1987).
67. Id. at 869.
68. Id. at 870. Not only did the BIA reiterate its Acosta position that the two standards
were not meaningfully different, but, with respect to asylum, it addressed the question whether
the aliens would be singled out for persecution. Id.
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plate language that it had used all along to assess asylum claims. 69
In Arteaga v. INS 70 the court re-emphasized its point that the
BIA should make some clear statement about the applicable standard.
In that case, the BIA deferred to Matter of Acosta, even as it quoted
from the Ninth Circuit's decision in Cardoza-Fonseca.71 The BIA dis-
appointed the court by requiring the alien to show that he would be
targeted for persecution. 72 This language certainly leaned more to-
ward the "clear probability" standard with little in the BIA's analysis
favoring the more generous asylum test. The court remanded the case
to the BIA for an explicit application of the "well-founded fear" stan-
dard. Although the BIA had paid lip service to Cardoza-Fonseca, it
had confused the issue not only by referring to Acosta, but also by
using language associated with the clear probability standard. 73
In Arteaga, the Ninth Circuit could have dismissed the BIA's
approach as a minor inconsistency that did not displace an overall
application of the correct standard. The court made such a judgment
in Sanchez- Trujillo74 because the BIA persuaded the court that it was
on the right track when it quoted from, and explicitly recognized, the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Cardoza-Fonseca. In Arteaga, however,
the BIA took a different tack. In its asylum review, the BIA not only
clung to the "likelihood" and "would be" language normally associ-
ated with the "clear probability" standard, but supported its position
by reference to that line of cases. Therefore, in reviewing the BIA's
decision as a whole, the Ninth Circuit had no choice but to conclude
that the BIA had incorrectly applied the clear probability standard to
an asylum case.
The Ninth Circuit had another chance to review the BIA's ap-
proach in Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS.75 Rodriguez-Rivera greatly resem-
69. Id. at 869. See also Doe v. INS, 867 F.2d 285, 290 (6th Cir. 1989).
70. 836 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1988).
71. Id. at 1231.
72. Id. at 1232.
73. Id. at 1231. See also Castaneda-Hemandez v. INS, 826 F.2d 1526 (6th Cir. 1987)
(although BIA used language suggesting different standards for asylum and withholding of
deportation, the issue remained whether the BIA in fact used a more generous standard for
asylum).
74. In Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, the court said that "[tihe use of one particular word [was]
not dispositive of whether the proper standard was applied." 801 F.2d 1571, 1579 (9th Cir.
1986). The court saw a substantial difference between a requirement that an alien "would be
persecuted" and a requirement that an alien have a "well-founded fear that he would be perse-
cuted." Id. (quoting Florez-De Solis v. INS, 796 F.2d 330, 336 (9th Cir. 1986) (Wallace, J.,
concurring)).
75. 848 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1988).
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bled Arteaga. In both cases, the Ninth Circuit found that the BIA
had affirmed its Acosta position even after it had quoted from that
court's opinion in Cardoza-Fonseca. However, the court upheld the
BIA's decision in Rodriguez-Rivera. It realized that the BIA had
qualified its Acosta reference by acknowledging the Ninth Circuit's
differing views of the standards under asylum and withholding of de-
portation.76 While, in both cases, the BIA held that the alien had
failed in his asylum claim because he did not show that he would be
singled out for persecution, 77 the court noted that the BIA in Rodri-
guez-Rivera had not followed the statement with a citation to cases
applying the clear probability standard as it had in Arteaga.
78
The Rodriguez-Rivera court pointed out, however, that it did not
rely solely on any of the above factors, because it wanted to continue
the Sanchez-Trujillo approach of looking at the BIA's entire opinion
before reaching any conclusions. 79 Understandably, the court did not
want to attribute any undue significance to the BIA's citation of
Acosta or to the "likelihood of persecution" language. By themselves,
those references meant little when not taken within the context of the
entire opinion. However, the court digressed by suggesting that the
presence of the three Arteaga factors in another context would not
"necessarily mandate reversal."' 80
At some point the Board's reliance on a number of Arteaga-type
factors should suffice to provoke judicial concern about the appropri-
ate standard. If the BIA cites Cardoza-Fonseca but then promotes
Acosta, the "clear probability" cases and the "likelihood of persecu-
tion" language, this imprecision generates doubt about the BIA's ap-
proach. While the mere use of certain words should not provide a
magical solution to the problem, the court in Rodriguez-Rivera
seemed reluctant to acknowledge the BIA's vacillation. A court must
examine the BIA's entire opinion; however, a combination of Arteaga-
type factors must create concern about the BIA's application of the
proper standard. Obviously, in asylum cases, courts must have a
"clear indication . . . that the BIA applied the more generous well-
founded fear standard to a petitioner's asylum claim." 81
76. Id. at 1003.
77. Compare Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1986), with Rodriguez-Ri-
vera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 1988).
78. Rodriguez-Rivera, 848 F.2d at 1000 (9th Cir. 1988).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1004. The court tried to reach a satisfactory compromise. However, if the BIA
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After the Supreme Court's decision in Cardoza-Fonseca, the BIA
retreated from its position that the asylum and withholding standards
converged. In Matter of Mogharrabi,82 the BIA had its first opportu-
nity to assess the impact of Cardoza-Fonseca. Although the BIA ac-
cepted the Court's holding on the asylum standard, it still had to
determine the meaning of "well-founded fear."
After reviewing the approaches of dierent circuits, the 1tA
adopted the Fifth Circuit's formulation that a "well-founded fear" ex-
ists if the alien shows that "a reasonable person in his circumstances
would fear persecution. '8 3 The BIA believed that this formulation
restated the principle that the alien's fear should be subjectively genu-
ine and objectively reasonable. 84 This reasoning agreed with the no-
tion that a reasonable person could fear persecution even if no clear
probability of its occurrence existed.a5
Although the BIA reiterated that the evidence presented in sup-
port of asylum and withholding applications will usually be identical,
it emphasized that there must be separate findings on each applica-
tion.8 6 This was a welcome turn of events in light of the difficulty
caused by the BIA's occasional interchange of terminology. The
BIA's adherence to this position will facilitate determining whether
the BIA is applying the correct test. Furthermore, courts can evalu-
cites Supreme Court authority and then goes on to ignore the appropriate standard, there is
hardly any clear indication that the BIA is playing by the rules. As the Arteaga-type factors
increase, a court should exercise more care in looking to the BIA's assessment of the case.
82. Int. Dec. No. 3028 (BIA 1987).
83. Id. at 9 (citing Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1986)). See also
Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986).
84. See Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Yousif v.
INS, 794 F.2d 236, 243-44 (6th Cir. 1986) (subjective fear must be supported by objective
evidence); Hemandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1985) (fear must be genuine);
Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1985) (alien's subjective fears are
relevant after sufficient objective evidence introduced).
85. In Matter of Mogharrabi, the BIA restated the four elements that it required in Acosta
for an asylum applicant to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. The evidence must
show that
(1) the alien possesses a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in
others by means of punishment of some sort; (2) the persecutor is already aware, or
could easily become aware, that the alien possesses this belief or characteristic; (3)
the persecutor has the capability of punishing the alien; and (4) the persecutor has
the inclination to punish the alien.
Int. Dec. No. 3028, at 11 (quoting Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. No. 2986, at 22 (BIA 1985)).
However, in Mogharrabi the BIA changed the second requirement by omitting the word "eas-
ily" in an effort to bring the requirements into line with Cardoza-Fonseca. Mogharrabi, Int.
Dec. No. 3028, at 11.
86. Id. at 12. This approach would avoid the difficulties of cases like Rodriguez v. INS,
841 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1987), and Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1986).
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ate the BIA's findings in accordance with the appropriate standards of
Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca.
B. The Evidence
Even before the Supreme Court's ruling in Cardoza-Fonseca,
some courts tried to define "well-founded fear." In attempting to de-
fine this term, the Seventh Circuit required an alien to show "specific
facts establishing that he or she has actually been the victim of perse-
cution or has some other good reason to fear that he or she will be
singled out for persecution. ' 87 Quite often, the alien's own testimony
reflects the basis of his fear. If that is the case, the alien's testimony
alone will not suffice unless it is credible and specific. 88
The alien often has difficulty obtaining corroborating evidence of
his persecution claims. Although the lack of such evidence will not
necessarily defeat an alien's asylum petition, it places the burden on
the alien to provide a detailed, consistent and believable account of
the grounds for his fear.89 Giving a general account of oppressive
conditions in one's native country will not suffice. However, showing
that others in the alien's position generally have suffered at the hands
of the persecutors will help. 90 Evidence of threats or past persecution
will also help when examining conditions in the alien's homeland.
Nevertheless, the alien should not rely on conclusory statements to
obtain relief, because courts will generally analyze the evidence to
reach their own conclusions.
The Sixth Circuit took a step forward in Dawood-Haio v. INS9l
by requiring the BIA to reconsider an alien's case in the absence of
independent corroboration of the alien's allegation. Originally, the
BIA had discounted the alien's statements as having no basis in fact
simply because the statements were undocumented and self-serving. 92
However, no evidence impugned the alien's credibility. Further, in its
advisory opinion to the INS, the State Department's Bureau of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs had accepted the alien's
87. Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984).
88. Id.
89. See Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1985); Bolanos-Hernandez v.
INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984); Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984);
Matter of Mogharrabi, Int. Dec. No. 3028 (BIA 1987); HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 197.
90. See Matter of Mogharrabi, Int. Dec. No. 3028, at 10-11; HANDBOOK, supra note 46,
para. 43.
91. 800 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1986).
92. Id. at 96.
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version of events as true.93 The alien had testified that the Iraqi gov-
ernment had detained the alien and his father, and that the father
later died in jail from a heart attack. Despite these facts, the INS
seemed preoccupied with the idea that the alien was using the asylum
procedures to prolong his stay in the United States. Fortunately, the
court disagreed that the lack of documentary evidence meant that the
allie et i,LIIIUIy was "wILIIoJU, bails I laLL.
With no corroborating testimony, the alien's credibility takes on
additional significance. No unanimity exists among the courts regard-
ing the respect that should be accorded to credibility determinations
of immigration judges. In one case, the Ninth Circuit decreed that an
immigration judge did not have to believe an alien just because evi-
dence of widespread violence in the alien's country supported the
alien's testimony.95 The court was impressed that the immigration
judge was "uniquely qualified to decide whether an alien's testimony
[had] about it the ring of truth. ' 96 Therefore, although an alien's evi-
dence of persecution does not require direct corroboration, the alien
still must clear a credibility hurdle when presenting his case before the
immigration judge. Because an alien must satisfy his burden of proof
even if the INS does not challenge his evidence, he may be denied
relief if the express and implied findings of the immigration judge con-
cerning credibility are not favorable. 97
However, sometimes a court will come to an alien's rescue when
trivial errors appear in the alien's testimony. For example, in Marti-
nez-Sanchez v. INS,98 some confusion existed as to when the alien had
joined a paramilitary group. In addition, the alien claimed on his ap-
plication that he had two children but his testimony indicated that he
had four children. The court reasoned that these inconsistencies were
not enough for the BIA to question the alien's credibility and re-
manded the case to the BIA for a decision on the merits. Inconsisten-
cies also appeared in the alien's evidence in Platero-Cortez v. INS,99
but again the Ninth Circuit did not think that these inconsistencies
93. Id. The INS district director was required to request an advisory opinion from the
Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs of the Department of State. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.7 (1989).
94. Dawood-Haio, 800 F.2d at 96.
95. Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985).
96. Id.
97. Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1986); Saballo-Cortez v. INS,
761 F.2d 1259, 1266 (9th Cir. 1985).
98. 794 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1986).
99. 804 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1986).
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should have affected the alien's petition. Doubt existed regarding the
date of the alien's departure from El Salvador and the date of the
alien's deportation from the United States.'1° The BIA focused on
the inconsistency in the alien's testimony concerning his employer's
place of death. 10 1 The court viewed these inconsistencies as having
"little or no relevance to the merits of [the alien's] claim."1 0 2 This
decision was hardly surprising, because the central question was
whether the alien was detained and tortured. 103 The determination of
this issue certainly did not depend upon a departure date or the place
of his employer's death.
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the credibility findings of the im-
migration judge in Turcio v. INS,'14 where the alien had lied about his
citizenship. The alien in Turcio feared that the United States would
deport him to El Salvador, his homeland. 105 The alien believed that
he could avoid returning to El Salvador if he said that he was from
Mexico. ' 06 The court put the alien's false claim of citizenship in per-
spective and characterized it as evidence of the alien's persecution
fears. 107 The court did not make its decision in a vacuum, but instead
reflected on the rationale for the alien's desire to avoid returning to
his homeland.
Under ordinary circumstances, these misstatements would have
worked against the alien because they had some bearing on his credi-
bility. However, the court first interpreted the alien's motivation for
lying before making a proper assessment of the alien's predicament. 108
The court considered the political climate in El Salvador to secure a
better understanding of the alien's claim. The court's reasoning came
as an encouraging sign for asylum-seekers and was consistent with the
Supreme Court's focus on the alien's fear of persecution in Cardoza-
Fonseca. In determining whether that fear has any foundation, a
court should consider the alien's credibility, especially when his testi-
mony stands alone.
100. Id. at 1131.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 821 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1987).
105. Id. at 1400.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1401.
108. The court said that "[u]ntrue statements by themselves are not reason for refusal of
refugee status and it is the examiner's responsibility to evaluate such statements in the light of
all the circumstances of the case." Id. at 1400.
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Sometimes a court will side with the alien when the immigration
judge has no "legitimate, articulable basis to question the alien's cred-
ibility."' 10 9 However, courts will usually grant substantial deference to
an immigration judge's findings and will not overturn these findings if
substantial evidence supports them. 01 This deference is reasonable
because the judge has the alien before him and can view the witness as
the testimony is given. if the BiA makes no finding regarding credi-
bility and the BIA has explained its decision, then the court will pre-
sume that the BIA found the alien credible."' This presumption puts
the burden on the BIA to make credibility findings to guide the court
once an appeal is filed. Any other approach would cause a court
needless worry about the alien's credibility, even when the BIA raised
no questions about it.' 12
Even when the alien gets past the credibility problem, he still
must deal with the type of evidence required for relief. In Bolanos-
Hernandez v. INS,11 3 Salvadoran guerrillas threatened to kill an alien
if he did not join their organization. Although these specific threats
occurred in an environment of general civil unrest, the court still
found a likelihood of persecution. 1 14 This result came as little sur-
prise. Even though the Ninth Circuit had previously held that gen-
eral conditions of violence alone could not sustain a claim of
persecution,' 15 the Bolanos-Hernandez court could not ignore a spe-
cific threat against the alien, just because the threat reflected wide-
spread violence in his region. Indeed, the general unrest in the region
must have lent more credibility to the seriousness of the alien's situa-
109. In Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit held that
the immigration judge determined the alien's credibility on matters that revealed nothing
about whether the alien feared for his safety in Nicaragua. Id. at 1338. The immigration judge
had questioned (1) the discrepancies in the dates the alien provided in his asylum application;
(2) the alien's failure to marry the mother of the alien's children; and (3) the alien's failure to
apply for asylum in the other countries the alien visited before coming to the United States.
Id.
110. Vilorio-Lopez v. INS, 852 F.2d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir. 1988); Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d
1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987); Saballo-Cortez v. INS, 761 F.2d 1259, 1262 (9th Cir. 1985).
111. Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1989); Damaize-Job v. INS, 787
F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986).
112. See Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986); Canjura-Flores v. INS,
784 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1985).
113. 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984).
114. Id. at 1286.
115. See Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1984); Martinez-Romero v.
INS, 692 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1982).
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tion. 116 Understandably, the Bolanos-Hernandez court recognized the
significance of the specific threats against the alien, even though no
independent corroboration backed up these threats." 7 The imposi-
tion of a corroboration requirement in a case like Bolanos-Hernandez
would deny the alien the protection the statute contemplates.," The
court found that the alien's testimony was so credible and convincing
that it would have contradicted the statutory objective to require
other evidence, especially when nothing refuted the alien's story. The
court knew that a contrary approach would make it almost impossible
for an alien to comply with section 243(h)."
9
In section 243(h) cases, even if the alien proves that he has re-
ceived threats, he still must show that the threat is serious and that,
more likely than not, the threat will come to fruition. This will de-
pend on whether the threatening entity has the ability to carry out the
threat. 20 In Bolanos-Hernandez, the court found it significant that
guerrillas had killed or injured some of the alien's friends who had
previously rejected the guerrillas' overtures.'
2'
Occasionally, an alien may consider himself subject to attack in
the general mel6e of civil strife because others perceive him as a repre-
sentative of the government. Whether an alien has a legitimate fear of
persecution in this situation is questionable. In Matter of Fuentes 122,
a policeman from El Salvador feared returning to his native country
because of the guerrillas there. The BIA believed that any danger
facing the policeman strongly related to the nature of his employment
as well as the domestic unrest prevalent in El Salvador. 123 This result
parallelled the decision in Acosta, where the BIA resisted the tempta-
tion of converting general civil unrest into individual persecution.
24
In Fuentes, the situation was even clearer for the BIA, because the
BIA viewed a policeman as an extension of the government forces. 25
116. See Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985); Zavala-Bonilla v. INS,
730 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1984); McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981).
117. See Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1285.
118. Id. See also Canjura-Flores v. INS, 784 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1985).
119. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1285. See also McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312,
1319 (9th Cir. 1981); Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1355 (1983).
120. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1285.
121. Id. at 1286.
122. Int. Dec. No. 3065 (BIA 1988).
123. Id. at 5.
124. See Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. No. 2986, at 17, 29.
125. Matter of Fuentes, Int. Dec. No. 3065, at 5.
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The policeman just happened to oppose the guerrillas. Thus, the BIA
equated the danger the alien faced to that of an ordinary military
combatant in the internal fray. However, an interesting paradox
arose here since the policeman's chances for showing persecution de-
creased as the overall level of violence in El Salvador increased. The
policeman found it rather difficult under such circumstances to con-
vince the BIA that he was singled out for persecution.
26
Occasionally an alien cannot meet the burden of proof under sec-
tion 243(h) but instead can qualify for asylum under section 208. The
clear probability standard of section 243(h) requires the alien to pro-
duce objective evidence, whereas his section 208 claim only requires
proof of a subjective fear that is based on some reasonable ground. In
Blanco-Comarribas v. INS, 127 the Ninth Circuit had an opportunity to
distinguish between these two standards of proof. While the court
upheld the BIA's decision to deny section 243(h) relief, it reversed the
BIA's decision to deny asylum relief under section 208. The alien's
relatives opposed the Nicaraguan government and were persecuted on
that account. However, the alien presented no evidence that the rela-
tives' conduct placed his life in jeopardy. Therefore, the alien could
not comply with the required burden of proof for withholding of de-
portation. However, the court believed the alien's fear of persecution
was well-founded because the alien had demonstrated against the gov-
ernment and his father had disappeared in Nicaragua. 2
III. GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
A. Political Opinion
An alien may seek asylum and withholding of deportation on
several grounds. One such statutory ground is political opinion. This
political opinion basis of relief may be substantiated by evidence that
the alien's action or inaction incites others to persecute him.
126. See 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 997 (Sept. 26, 1988).
127. 830 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1987).
128. Id. at 1043. The court understood that the alien's fear had to be "both subjectively
genuine and objectively reasonable." Id. (quoting Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571,
1579 (9th Cir. 1986)). The court accepted the immigration judge's assessment of the alien's
testimony as candid and sincere. 830 F.2d at 1042. This satisfied the subjective component.
The alien's father disappeared and his aunts and cousins were arrested and threatened with
death because of their opposition to the revolution. The alien himself was accused of subver-
sive conduct and was arrested for three days. These events satisfied the second prong of the
test by being objectively reasonable. Id.
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1. Neutrality
Occasionally, the alien will base his political opinion claim on his
neutrality. In Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, the Ninth Circuit dealt with
the question whether it should characterize the alien's neutrality as a
political opinion. 129 The court stated that the alien's neutrality was
no less a political choice than joining a particular faction. 30 The
court believed that the decision not to join one group or the other
constituted a political rejection of both camps, and, in that sense, ex-
pressed a political opinion.13' The court thought it unrealistic to con-
fine the "political opinion" element to a choice between the two
conflicting groups-the guerrillas or the government. By simply re-
maining neutral, the alien was expressing his opinion that he rejected
the political ideologies of both groups. Only by allowing for this pos-
sibility would the alien be able to enjoy a genuine expression of polit-
ical opinion under the statute. 132
However, merely neglecting to join a particular group without
making a conscious decision to remain neutral does not constitute an
expression of political opinion. In those cases where courts have ac-
cepted neutrality as a grounds for relief, the alien had previously re-
jected overtures from a certain political faction and had consciously
decided to remain uninvolved. In Bolanos-Hernandez, the alien sev-
ered his connections with right-wing groups in El Salvador and then
refused to join the guerrillas despite their threats. 133 In Del Valle v.
INS, the alien declined specific invitations to join an insurgent group
and remained neutral while pursuing his studies. 134 The court had no
difficulty in recognizing the alien's "considered choice to take a neu-
tral stance."'' 35 However, if the alien is apathetic about conditions in
his country, and has given no thought to joining or avoiding political
factions, claiming neutrality will not help the alien in his quest for
asylum or withholding of deportation. 136 The mere non-commitment
to either side of a political struggle does not provide enough evidence
129. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1286 (9th Cir. 1984).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1280.
134. 776 F.2d 1407, 1413-14 (9th Cir. 1985).
135. Id. at 1414. See also Argueta v. INS, 759 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1985) (alien testified
that he had political opinion that was not in accord with either government or guerrillas and
therefore was politically neutral).
136. Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d
1015 (9th Cir. 1985); Saballo-Cortez v. INS, 761 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1984).
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to show a likelihood of persecution, especially if nobody has
threatened the alien. In this case, he would simply face the same dan-
ger as any other person living in the community. 137
While the Ninth Circuit is the only court to explore this neutral-
ity principle in depth, 38 the BIA has rejected the principle where the
alien waited until his deportation hearing to express his position. In
latter of Vigil, 139 the alien testified at his deportation hearing that he
wanted to remain neutral during the civil war in El Salvador, yet he
had done nothing before the hearing to evince his neutrality. The
BIA decried the alien's plea for asylum because it did not want to blur
the distinction between genuine neutrality and a fear of general vio-
lence in the community. 40 The BIA's decision concurred with the
rationale of Bolanos-Hernandez, that the neutrality defense should be
restricted to those cases where the alien has taken a principled posi-
tion of non-involvement, rather than one of mere disinterest.'14
2. Motivation
When determining whether the alien's political opinion could
subject him to persecution, the BIA and the courts have little reason
to examine the motivation behind an alien's political choice. The per-
tinent inquiry should be whether the alien has made a political deci-
sion. If the alien prefers one group over another, or if the alien
remains neutral amidst the political fray, it should not matter why he
has done so. An alien may make that kind of decision for non-polit-
ical reasons, but that decision would not affect his political opinion in
the statutory sense.
As a matter of policy, delving into the motivation for an alien's
political decision would be undesirable. Section 208 and section
243(h) grant aliens the opportunity to take certain positions in the
United States for which they may be persecuted elsewhere. It would
be problematic to suggest that an alien should be rescued from perse-
137. See, e.g., Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1984). "To the extent that
[the alien] also faces danger because of his noncommitment to either side, his danger is the
same as faced by other Salvadorans." Id. at 290.
138. In Cruz-Lopez v. INS, the Fourth Circuit would not take a position on the neutrality
principle because the alien did not prove persecution. 802 F.2d 1518, 1520 n.3 (4th Cir. 1986).
139. Int. Dec. No. 3050 (BIA 1988).
140. Id. at 7 (citing Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985) (neutrality
is a political opinion) and Matter of Mogharrabi, Int. Dec. No. 3028 (BIA 1987) (general fear
of violence not enough for asylum)).
141. See Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1988); Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396
(9th Cir. 1987); Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986).
536 [Vol. 12:515
Asylum & Withholding of Deportation
cution because of his political opinion and then turn around and ques-
tion the alien's motivation for that opinion. Congress did not intend
to protect only those aliens whose motivation for political expression
agrees with our own. Furthermore, examining the alien's motivation
does not help determine whether the alien was persecuted on account
of his political persuasion. Even the persecutors do not examine their
targets in this degree of detail. If an alien remains neutral and refuses
to support anyone, the persecutors will hardly pause to examine the
alien's rationale for not siding with them, focusing instead on the
alien's manifestations of political opinion. 142
In contrast, it is appropriate to examine the persecutor's motiva-
tion. If a government erroneously believes that an alien subscribes to
a certain political philosophy, showing the government's motivation
for persecuting him becomes relevant. A government normally would
not persecute its own supporters. Therefore, in this situation, the cen-
tral issue is how the government evaluates the alien's philosophy. 143
The government's perceptions assume a particularly important role if
the alien has not taken any public position against those in power.
After all, why would the government threaten such an alien or seek to
do him harm?
This question confronted the court in Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS. 144
The BIA had held that the alien was not threatened because of polit-
ical opinion, as neither the alien nor her family had engaged in any
political activity in El Salvador. 145 Nevertheless, guerrillas continu-
ally beat, kidnapped, harassed and even killed relatives of the alien.
In determining the significance of these tragic events, the court looked
142. See Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1987); Bolanos-Hemandez v. INS,
767 F.2d 1277, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1985).
143. See Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986); Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS,
777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985); Argueta v. INS, 759 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1985).
144. 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985). The alien petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a review of
the INS denial of her motion to reopen her deportation proceedings. The alien had originally
entered the United States without inspection and had appealed her deportation. While that
appeal was pending, the government deported her in error. She was eventually brought back
to the United States. She made a motion to reopen the deportation proceedings so that she
could apply for asylum on the basis of events that occurred during her stay in El Salvador
when the government mistakenly deported her. Id. at 512. A motion to reopen must be sup-
ported by "affidavits or other evidentiary material." 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 (1989). The petition
must also be based on new material evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1989). The abuse of discretion
standard is used to review the BIA's decision that an alien has not satisfactorily explained his
failure to apply for asylum before. INS v. Abudu, 108 S. Ct. 904 (1988).
145. Hernandez-Ortiz, 777 F.2d at 516.
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at the government's motivation.14 6 The government regarded Her-
nandez-Ortiz and her relatives as part of the opposition. Therefore, in
reversing the BIA, the court concluded that the persecution centered
on the government's perception of the alien's political preferences.1
47
This solution dealt realistically with the problem, because the court
emphasized the government's beliefs about the alien. The alien's ac-
tual l.OUllLllal coluuctl.l nol lo.nlgc, ciscdliiLli as L11., Illl .~ LllL tia ILUI--
The persecutor's motivation is not relevant unless his actions are
meant to subvert the alien's political views. 149 Therefore, if a political
faction engages in persecution as a part of a destabilization campaign
against the government, this action would not necessarily constitute
persecution for political opinion. One must examine whether the per-
secutor has targeted the alien because of the latter's particular charac-
teristics or beliefs. This approach is consistent with the notion that
the political ramifications of general civil disturbances, by themselves,
do not involve the political opinion element. 50 There must be more
substantiation.
3. Forcible Recruitment
Sometimes an alien is forced to join a guerrilla brigade. If he
escapes, he may then fear persecution not only from the guerrillas, but
also from the government forces. In Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 5 ' the
146. Id.
147. Id. In trying to arrive at the persecutor's motivation, the court thought it helpful to
examine the relationship between the political views of the persecutor and those of the alien.
Id.
148. The court expressed its view by stating that "it is irrelevant whether a victim actually
possesses any of these opinions as long as the government believes that he does." Hernandez-
Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 517 (9th Cir. 1985). See also Argueta v. INS, 759 F.2d 1395, 1397
(9th Cir. 1985) (government erroneously believed that alien was a guerrilla).
149. See Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516-17 (9th Cir. 1985); Matter of Acosta,
Int. Dec. No. 2986, at 32 (BIA 1985).
150. See Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 826 (1987). The Refugee Act of 1980 does not define the term "political opinion." How-
ever, there is evidence that Congress intended to exclude from the term "refugee" those aliens
who were simply displaced by general civil strife. An early version of the Senate bill provided
relief for displaced persons. The Senate Report stated that "[t]he new definition has been
amended by the Committee to include 'displaced persons' who are not technically covered by
the United Nations Convention to insure maximum flexibility in responding to the needs of the
homeless who are of concern to the United States." S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1979). However, the joint conference committee's explanatory statement left no doubt that
the conference substituted a House amendment which incorporated the U.N. definition, thus
rejecting the Senate's attempt to stray from that definition. See H. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 19 (1979).
151. 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989).
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alien faced such a dilemma. The alien was drafted into a guerrilla
organization in El Salvador. When he escaped and applied for asylum
in the United States, he feared harm from two fronts. First, he be-
lieved that the guerrillas would harm him because he had deserted
them. Second, he feared that the military forces would persecute him
because of his previous guerrilla activity. 1
5 2
The guerrillas' political strategy in Maldonado-Cruz focused on
overthrowing the government by force. They welcomed additional
guerrilla recruits and used their persuasive powers to enlist them.
The guerilla regime valued a loyal membership as this was the only
way that the guerrillas' mission could succeed. Therefore, the alien's
initial association with the guerrillas did not possess any element of
persecution. The guerrillas wanted the alien's help and looked for-
ward to the alien's energetic participation in their military ventures.
However, the alien did not align himself with the guerrillas, and after
his escape, he did not join the military forces either. The Ninth Cir-
cuit interpreted the alien's actions as an expression of neutrality in the
on-going conflict, thus characterizing the alien's fear as one founded
on political opinion. 153 The alien knew that the guerrillas would be
upset about his decision, and he feared that they would convey their
displeasure with him through terrorist tactics. But the court also de-
termined that the alien had reason to fear government persecution
since the authorities had labelled him a subversive because of his pre-
vious association with the guerrillas,' 54 even though this association
was involuntary. Thus, the court viewed both the government's and
guerrillas' perceptions of the alien's activities to determine that the
"political opinion" criterion was satisfied.
The result in Maldonado-Cruz does not mean that all guerrilla
activity equates to an exercise in persecution. The alien in Matter of
Rodriguez-Mano 155 had essentially the same fears as the alien in Mal-
donado-Cruz. However, Rodriquez-Mano had to refute allegations
that his involuntary guerrilla service had rendered him ineligible for
relief because he had persecuted others. Characterizing the guerrillas'
objective as the overthrow of the government, the BIA decided that
any harm arising incidentally out of such action should not be treated
as persecution. 56 This assessment gave a degree of respectability to
152. Id. at 790.
153. Id. at 791.
154. Id. at 792.
155. Int. Dec. No. 3088 (BIA 1988).
156. Id. at 6-7.
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the guerrillas' agenda that must have surprised even the alien, but the
BIA did not want to expand the persecution definition. Instead, the
BIA held that activities directly related to a civil war were not perse-
cution, and that therefore recruitment by the guerrillas was not
persecution. 157
In making its decision, the BIA must have visualized the frenzy
involved in the guerrillas' recruitment. An alien's rejection of the
guerrillas' overtures would lead to another phase of the insurgent
strategy: not-so-gentle persuasion to convince the alien of his error.
However, the BIA still did not perceive this conduct as persecution,
since a guerrilla organization cannot afford continuous desertions
within its ranks. If it had designated the guerrillas' conduct as perse-
cution in the civil war context, the BIA feared that it would have
expanded the number of freedom fighters that might be disqualified
from relief. 158
The seemingly conflicting decisions in Rodriguez-Mano and Mal-
donado-Cruz can be reconciled by distinguishing between the general
upheaval caused by guerrilla warfare from the coercion used to return
an ex-guerrilla to the fold. The court in Maldonado-Cruz granted re-
lief because it found the guerrillas had targeted the alien because of
his desertion and his clear desire to discontinue any relationship with
them. The guerrillas' pursuit of the alien had ceased to be mere re-
cruitment. Furthermore, the court found it significant that the alien
feared mistreatment because of his articulated neutrality.1 59
4. Draft Evasion
Other considerations may arise when an alien evades military
service in his own country. Under ordinary circumstances, a draft
evader will not obtain asylum, even though his failure to serve may in
itself constitute an expression of political opinion. 6° But where the
157. Id. at 8 (citing Martinez-Romero v. INS, 692 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1985); Matter of
Sanchez & Escobar, Int. Dec. No. 2996 (BIA 1985); Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. No. 2986
(BIA 1985)).
158. Rodriguez-Mano, Int. Dec. No. 3088, at 8.
159. Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1989).
160. See Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1988); Espinoza-Martinez v.
INS, 754 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir. 1985); Matter of Vigil, Int. Dec. No. 3050 (BIA 1988); Matter of
Lee, 13 I. & N. Dec. 236 (1969); Matter of Liao, 11 1. & N. Dec. 113 (1965). In Kaveh-
Haghigy v. INS, an alien claimed that Khomeini was conducting "an illegal, revolutionary war
that [made] military service tantamount to persecution of all young males in the country." 783
F.2d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). The Ninth Circuit denied asylum because,
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government militia has a policy of engaging in atrocities, the alien's
chances of gaining asylum relief improves.
In M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 16 1 the Fourth Circuit addressed this
issue on a motion to reopen an asylum proceeding. The BIA had
denied the alien asylum relief because he had not shown that his mili-
tary duties would require him to participate in atrocities. Finding
that the BIA had imposed an unduly harsh burden of proof on the
alien, the court insisted on inquiring further into the possibility that
the alien, by not evading the draft, would participate in the govern-
ment's misconduct. 62 The court determined that that inquiry could
be made only by first assessing the pervasiveness of the atrocities. It
was confident that the likelihood of the alien's involvement in the gov-
ernment's atrocities increased as such misconduct became more wide-
spread. 63 This approach departed from the BIA's doctrine that
where the danger is widespread, the alien has less chance of making
his case. 64 It preserved an opportunity for the alien to separate him-
self from the dreadful activities of a group bent on mischief, without
having to provide any evidence that he would actually engage in atro-
cious conduct.
The court did not think the alien had to show that the atrocious
acts stemmed from the policies of the government in power. The alien
met his burden of proof when he showed that the government had
neither the ability nor the desire to control the armed forces. 65 Fur-
thermore, it did not matter whether it was the lawful government of
the alien or some foreign invader who controlled the persecutors. In
"[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, it is not the place of the judiciary to evaluate the political
justifications of the actions of foreign governments." Id.
Disproportionately severe punishment for a draft evasion attributable to persecution trig-
gers other issues. See M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 858 F.2d 210, 215 (4th Cir. 1988), reh'g
granted, 866 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1989); Matter of Vigil, Int. Dec. No. 3050, at 10 (BIA 1988);
HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 169.
161. 858 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1988), reh'g granted, 866 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1989).
162. Id. at 218.
163. Id.
164. See Matter of Fuentes, Int. Dec. No. 3065 (BIA 1988); Matter of Sanchez & Escobar,
Int. Dec. No. 2996 (BIA 1985); Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. No. 2986 (BIA 1985). In these
cases the BIA might have been preoccupied with the idea that the alien should have to show
that he would be singled out for persecution. Under this theory the alien would be lost in the
general mel6e as the danger intensified and therefore would be less of a target.
165. See M.A. A26851062, 858 F.2d at 210 (government unwilling or unable to control
armed forces); Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (persecution by single
soldier whom government could not control was basis for well-founded fear); Bolanos-Her-
nandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985) (persecution must be by government or group
that government cannot control).
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Matter of Salim, the BIA had accepted the alien's draft evasion as a
basis for persecution since the alien, as a soldier in the Soviet army,
would have been forced to commit atrocities on his own people. 166
The BIA tried to distinguish Salim from MA. A26851062 based on
the fact that the source of the persecution in Salim emanated from
foreign invaders. The court in M.A. A26851062 did not find this dis-
iinciiou l't~ltevallt. tk"e lgl'l, tllhe Salvadoran ulitr h*x** d . ...... ......
the 1949 Geneva Conventions as a result of its atrocities. The court
thought that there was no reason to give atrocities committed by do-
mestic forces greater respect than those committed by forces under
foreign control. 67
5. Insurrection
Some aliens find political satisfaction in evading a draft; others
prefer to take an active role in organizing an underground opposition
against the government in power. In countries that do not tolerate
that opposition, aliens may resort to a coup d'6tat. If the coup fails,
the alien may find himself at the mercy of the surviving government.
The question presented in this context is whether fear of that danger
should qualify the alien for asylum.
Ordinarily, one would expect that this sort of conduct would en-
counter severe punishment. Mindful of that prospect, the alien in
Dwomoh v. Sava 168 argued that such punishment would constitute de
facto political persecution, because the government in Ghana strove
to silence all opposition.
The Dwomoh court acknowledged that no constitutional method
of changing the government in Ghana existed at the time of the alien's
conduct. 169 Therefore, the court was faced with a difficult policy
question: whether it would protect an alien who had defied the laws of
his own country and engaged in conduct which would not legiti-
mately be tolerated elsewhere.1 70 The court sympathized with the
alien's belief that a coup d'6tat represented the only mechanism for
changing his government. However, the BIA had reservations about
166. 18 I. & N. Dec. 311, 313 (1982).
167. M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 858 F.2d 210, 218 (4th Cir. 1988), reh'g granted, 866 F.2d
660 (4th Cir. 1989).
168. 696 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
169. Id. at 978.
170. An alien who advocates the overthrow of the United States Government by "force,
violence, or other unconstitutional means" is excludable from the United States. Immigration
& Nationality Act § 212(a)(28)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(F) (1988).
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the legitimacy of this claim, as the alien had not openly criticized the
Ghanaian government before the attempted coup. Therefore, the
BIA believed that the alien faced prosecution solely for the act of at-
tempting a coup rather than persecution for his political views.'
7'
The court countered this view by pointing out that the alien's political
expressions alone could have resulted in his imprisonment. 172 There-
fore, only through his actions, rather than his opinions, could the
alien guarantee success in changing the political status quo. Once he
made the decision to proceed with his plan, he could not realistically
discuss it if he hoped for success. However, the appropriate question
is whether the alien's participation in this kind of activity should pre-
vent him from meeting the criterion for political persecution.
At first glance, this question appears easily resolved because one
would reasonably expect a government to protect itself from insurrec-
tion. Therefore, an alien like Dwomoh would normally receive little
sympathy for his asylum claim. This assertion, however, has merit
only if the alien's punishment truly results from prosecution for his
acts rather than persecution for his beliefs. Therefore, in analyzing
whether the alien is subject to retaliation for trying to remove a gov-
ernment or for evading a draft, one should focus on the nature and
motivation underlying the prosecution.
73
If the country from which the alien seeks refuge does not guaran-
tee basic human rights, the alien dissident should find greater sympa-
thy for his claim. As a result, it is essential to take account of the
political conditions in the alien's country. 174 This analysis puts the
alien's conduct in perspective before resolving the persecution issue.
The asylum regulations themselves provide guidance in this regard by
171. Dwomoh, 696 F. Supp. at 979.
172. Id.
173. Dwomoh v. Sava, 696 F. Supp. 970, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). See HANDBOOK, supra
note 46, para. 86.
174. See Dwomoh, 696 F. Supp. at 978-79. At the time of this alien's application, the
government had to seek an advisory opinion from the State Department's Bureau of Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs ("BHRHA"). Effective November 2, 1987, the BHRHA
will cease giving advisory opinions on every asylum application. The objective is to give input
that is not available to the INS. In special cases, therefore, the BHRHA will give an individual
advisory opinion. Thus, from now on, the State Department's Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices will be quite important in the final analysis of the alien's application. 64 IN-
TERPRETER RELEASES 1215 (1987) (letter dated Oct. 21, 1987 from Edward H. Wilkinson,
Director of Asylum Affairs, BHRHA, to Chief Immigration Judge William R. Robie). The
State Department report on the human rights in Ghana was not very encouraging and the
court used it as a guide in assessing the nature of the law on which the alien's prosecution was
based. See Dwomoh, 696 F. Supp. at 978 & n. 11, 979.
19901
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 12:515
denying relief if the alien has committed a serious non-political
crime. 7 -5 Therefore, a political crime may be defined differently as the
perspective varies. 176 This explains why a court may sympathize in
some cases with a draft evader or a coup organizer despite the fact
that each faces punishment for seemingly nonpolitical offenses. Con-
ditions in some countries are so oppressive that aliens may feel the
necessity Lo take actinl LIiaL may 0u, r iun ,,to, nI, . .
political context. 77 This suggests that an alien's actions must rest on
genuine political motives and must focus on change in the political
structure. 78 Further, an alien must ensure that his actions are not
"grossly out of proportion to the alleged objective" and that a direct,
causal link exists between the two. 7 9
175. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(1)(v) (1989). See also Immigration & Nationality Act
§ 243(h)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C) (1988) (withholding of deportation must be denied if
alien has committed serious non-political crime).
176. See Dwomoh, 696 F. Supp. at 978. The Handbook provides the rationale for giving
the alien this protection. It recognizes that it is quite appropriate to exclude an alien who
poses a threat to the state while at the same time recognizing that there are circumstances
where the alien's conduct may be forgiven. It states:
The aim of this exclusion clause is to protect the community of a receiving country
from the danger of admitting a refugee who has committed a serious common crime.
It also seeks to render due justice to a refugee who has committed a common crime
(or crimes) of a less serious nature or has committed a political offence.
HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 151.
177. The Handbook gives some guidance on the definition of a political crime. It says that
"regard should be given in the first place to its nature and purpose i.e. whether it has been
committed out of genuine political motives and not merely for personal reasons or gain."
HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 152. See also Note, Political Legitimacy in the Law of Polit-
ical Asylum, 99 HARV. L. REV. 450, 466 (1985).
178. See G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 45, at 60-61; HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para.
152.
179. See HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 152. In McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591 (9th
Cir. 1986), the court denied withholding of deportation relief to the alien because there were
serious reasons to believe that the alien had committed serious non-political crimes. The alien
proposed that an act should "be considered a political offense when (1) there was an insurrec-
tion or rebellion at the time the criminal acts were committed, and (2) the criminal acts were
incident to or in furtherance of that insurrection or rebellion." Id. at 596. The court rejected
the alien's focus on the state of mind and concentrated on the circumstances surrounding the
alien's acts. It said that "[a] balancing approach including consideration of the offense's 'pro-
portionality' to its objective and its degree of atrocity makes good sense." Id. (citing G.
GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 45, at 61). The court was careful to observe, however, that for an
act to be characterized as political, the alien must have political motivations. McMullen, 788
F.2d at 597. In the final analysis, it is the direct causal link between the crime and political
objective, when balanced with the proportionality and atrocity, that warrants the "political
crime" protection. Id. The court also drew a distinction between this case and the political
offense exception in extradition proceedings. The analysis in extradition cases depends on the
language of a particular treaty, while in withholding cases it depends on the standard in the
U.N. Convention and Protocol which is reflected in INA § 243(h). Id. at 596. The political
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6. Personal Dispute v. Personal Persecution
In Lazo-Majano v. INS,18 0 the political opinion criterion arose in
another context. Olympia Lazo-Majano, a thirty-four-year-old wo-
man whose husband worked with a paramilitary group which the
guerrillas pursued, alleged that she was repeatedly beaten and raped
by a Sergeant Zuniga of the Salvadoran military because he knew that
her husband had left El Salvador for the United States. According to
Lazo-Majano, Zuniga spread rumors that she was a subversive.' 8'
Upon finally reaching the United States herself, Lazo-Majano sought
asylum under section 208 and withholding of deportation under sec-
tion 243(h). The court was faced with the question whether Zuniga's
conduct constituted persecution on account of Lazo-Majano's polit-
ical opinion or merely a personal vendetta on Zuniga's part. 18 2
In her defense, Lazo-Majano alleged that Zuniga had spread ru-
mors that she was a subversive. She contended that this constituted
evidence of persecution for political opinion.18 3 The question facing
the court was whether Zuniga really believed these allegations or, al-
ternatively, whether he had spread these rumors merely to cover his
personal agenda. 18 4 The fact that Lazo-Majano asserted she wanted
to escape from Zuniga, but continually returned to him and made no
effort to complain about his conduct, 8 5 was sufficient to raise the
question whether Zuniga made the accusations solely to subject Lazo-
Majano to his carnal desires. 8 6 However, the court thought differ-
ently and held it was the "cynical imputation of political opinion" to
the alien that mattered. 8 7 But the court could also have justified its
position by recognizing that Zuniga's allegations might have reached
the ears of other prospective persecutors. Thus, the alien would then
offense exception on which the alien in McMullen relied was restated recently in Quinn v.
Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986). The court said, "[flirst,
there must be an uprising-a political disturbance related to the struggle of individuals to alter
or abolish the existing government in their country . . . . Second, the charged offense must
have been committed in furtherance of the uprising." Id. at 817.
180. 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
181. Id. at 1433.
182. Id. at 1434.
183. Id. at 1433. In Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 517 (9th Cir. 1985), the court
said that "it is irrelevant whether a victim actually possesses any of these opinions as long as
the government believes that he does." See also Argueta v. INS, 759 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir.
1985).
184. See Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1987) (Poole, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 1440.
186. Id. at 1439.
187. Id. at 1435.
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have had a reasonable fear that these other persecutors would believe
the sergeant's imputations and act against her on that basis.188
One should note that Lazo-Majano did not receive threats be-
cause she refused to join a political organization. Thus, her case dif-
fered from that of Argueta v. INS, 8 9 where the alien was threatened
because his persecutors actually believed that he was politically in-
voived. Lazo-Majano's case also differed from Bolanos-Hernandez, in
which the alien took a politically neutral position.190 The Lazo-
Majano court identified the alien's belief that the Armed Force was
responsible for "lawlessness, rape, torture and murder" as a political
opinion.191 If the alien was persecuted for this opinion, one might
question whether she formulated it only after her own unfortunate
experience. After all, the statute requires the persecution to be on
account of political opinion. It does not explicitly cover persecution
engendering a political opinion.192 Furthermore, although one might
regard disbelief in the government's ability to control the military as a
political statement, a close question existed as to whether Zuniga
abused her for that reason. 93 However, it was encouraging that the
court took a liberal view in assessing the political opinion requirement
of the statute.
Some courts have resisted the temptation to assign a "political
opinion" label so liberally to a government official's actions against an
alien. For example, in Zayas-Marini v. INS,194 the alien refused to
involve himself in a smuggling scheme with one government official in
Paraguay, while accusing another official of embezzlement. Subse-
quently, both officials threatened the alien. The court affirmed the
188. Note, "Political Opinions" of Refugees: Interpreting International Sources, 63 WASH.
L. REV. 395, 412 & n.109 (1988).
189. 759 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1985). The alien was threatened because the "death squad"
believed that he was a member of a political organization. Id. at 1397. The court also found
that the alien had chosen to remain "politically neutral." Id.
190. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1985).
191. Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987).
192. An alien may qualify for asylum if he has a "well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion." Immigration & Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
An alien will qualify for withholding of deportation "if the Attorney General determines that
[the] alien's life or freedom would be threatened . . . on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Immigration & Nationality Act
§ 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988). See Note, supra note 188, at 415 n.128.
193. See Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1440 (Poole, J., dissenting). There was evidence that
the alien kept returning to the persecutor's apartment and that she actually lived with the
persecutor's sister for some time. Id. at 1440-41.
194. 785 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1986).
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BIA's decision that the alien's political opinion did not result in his
differences with these officials. 95 After all, the alien had close rela-
tionships with other members of the Paraguayan government and did
not receive any threats from the two officials in question prior to his
altercation with them. Further, despite the fact that the alien's polit-
ical preferences were well known, the police did not detain the alien
for anything more serious than non-political, curfew violations.196 If
the officials disliked the alien, the court could find no basis other than
personal animosity.
1 97
In Lazo-Majano, the court did not treat the confrontation be-
tween the alien and the persecutor as personal, perhaps because of the
persecutor's power. Zuniga, as a sergeant in the Armed Forces, held
a threat over the alien's head to continue his domination. Judge
Poole, in his dissent, characterized this conduct as merely the actions
of a bully. 98 Lazo-Majano herself failed to clarify this issue by sug-
gesting that Zuniga would have acted the same way, even if he was
not a member of the military. 199 If genuine, these feelings indicated a
personal conflict between the two parties, not a politically motivated
persecution.
The Fifth Circuit dealt with a similar problem in Campos-
Guardado v. INS,200 and yet reached a different conclusion. There,
the alien visited an uncle who was involved in the agrarian reform
movement in El Salvador and was raped by two men who attacked
her uncle's family during the course of the visit. She subsequently
recognized one of the attackers, who threatened to kill her if she dis-
closed his identity.
The alien tried to benefit from the political implication of the
attack on her uncle, who was the chief of a local agricultural coopera-
tive. The civil disturbances which arose from the agrarian reform
movement eventually affected the uncle's farm, where the alien hap-
pened to be visiting. However, the court considered the alien's pres-
ence fortuitous and believed that if her attacker subsequently pursued
her, it was solely because of his concern that she could identify him
rather than because of her political opinion.20 1 The court recognized
195. Id. at 806.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987) (Poole, J., dissenting).
199. See id. at 1440.
200. 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 92 (1987).
201. See id. at 297.
19901
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that the uncle's involvement in agrarian reform had political implica-
tions but asserted that no evidence existed that the alien herself was
attacked for her own beliefs. 20 2 Clearly, the alien feared that her un-
cle's opponents might, in turn, attack her. However, she lacked the
evidence to connect that persecution to her own real or perceived
political opinion.
Clearly, however, in assessing the political nature of persecution,
courts consider the persecutor's position of power. The Lazo-Majano
court reflected this view by indicating that Zuniga asserted "the polit-
ical opinion that a man has a right to dominate and [that] he ...
persecuted Olympia to force her to accept this opinion without rebel-
lion. '20 3 This trend continued in Desir v. llchert,204 when an alien
refused to pay bribes to the Haitian security forces, the Ton Ton
Macoutes, and as a result he was arrested, assaulted, and prevented
from earning a living in Haiti.
The court perceived the relationship between Desir and the Ton
Ton Macoutes as one pitting the weak against the powerful. 20 5 This is
analogous to the relationship in Lazo-Majano. In both cases, the gov-
ernment agents had the ability to carry out their threats due to their
superior status and political power.20 6 The Desir court carefully con-
trasted these two cases with Zayas-Marini, in which the disagreement
arose between social and political equals. In Desir no such semblance
of equality existed, because the trademark of the persecutors was their
power of intimidation. They exercised their authority through extor-
tion. Therefore, Desir's failure to succumb to their demands placed
him in a vulnerable position. The Ton Ton Macoutes could easily
characterize Desir as disloyal and subversive, thus aligning the full
force of the government against him. Thus, whether the victim actu-
ally has a political view at all is sometimes of little importance. All
that matters is the persecutor's perception of the victim's refusal to
cooperate .207 Therefore, the court in Desir accepted the fact that the
202. See id. at 289. See also Pierre v. Rivkind, 825 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1987) (dispute
with chief of Haitian security forces was personal in nature and not on account of political
opinion). Cf. Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977).
203. Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987).
204. 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1988).
205. Id. at 728.
206. Compare Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1435, with Desir, 840 F.2d at 728.
207. Desir, 840 F.2d at 728. See also Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987)
(alien is at risk if persecutor thinks the alien guilty of political opinion); Argueta v. INS, 759
F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1985) (persecution based on political opinion where persecutors believed
that alien was a guerrilla); Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985) (alien's
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Ton Ton Macoutes had attributed subversive views to the alien
merely because he would not succumb to extortion.
However, something that begins as a personal dispute between
two parties may blossom into government persecution, as was the case
in Blanco-Lopez v. INS.20 8 There, the alien disagreed with one Gallos
about the latter's treatment of an employee. Gallos retaliated by
falsely informing the Salvadoran police that the alien was a guerrilla
who illegally imported arms.20 9 The police arrested Blanco-Lopez
and detained him and three others for three days. After his release,
the security forces searched in vain for Blanco-Lopez, threatening to
kill him because he was reported to be a guerrilla.
210
Interestingly, the initial dispute did not take place between the
alien and any member of the government forces, making a decision as
to whether the "personal" dispute had changed into "political" perse-
cution more problematic. Although Gallos' false charges against
Blanco-Lopez originated from a personal, non-governmental disagree-
ment, the government's forces translated those charges into a search
and destroy mission.21 1 They believed Gallos' allegations and sought
to persecute the alien on that ground. Like the situation in Lazo-
Majano, it did not matter whether Blanco-Lopez was in fact a guer-
rilla or a subversive. 21 2 Rather it was the persecutors' designation
actual political views not relevant as long as government attributed certain political opinion to
alien).
208. 858 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1988).
209. Id. at 532.
210. Id. at 532-33.
211. The court stated:
We thus find it irrelevant that Blanco-Lopez's conflict with the Salvadoran govern-
ment may have been instigated in the first instance through a personal dispute with
Gallos, for it developed into a situation in which the security forces believed him to
be a guerrilla and attempted to persecute him for it.
Id. at 533-34.
212. Compare Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987) (cynical imputa-
tion of political opinion is what counts), with Blanco-Lopez v. INS, 858 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir.
1988) (security forces believed alien to be guerrilla). In Matter of Canas, Int. Dec. No. 3074
(BIA 1988), the aliens lost the "imputation of political opinion" argument that the government
would treat them as "subversives" or "guerrilla sympathizers" for their failure to perform
military service. Id. at 20. The aliens had objected to military service because of their religion.
The BIA viewed the aliens' "imputed political opinion" argument as not resting on the aliens'
particular circumstances, but on the belief that any male who failed to perform military service
was subject to prosecution. This was not sufficient to prevail because mere failure to serve
would not mean automatic characterization as a subversive. Id. According to the BIA, a
reasonable person in the aliens' position would have a fear of prosecution for his failure to
perform his military duty rather than a fear of persecution when all violators receive the same
treatment. Id. at 17.
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that mattered. It was pointless to argue about Blanco-Lopez's affilia-
tion if the government had already labelled him a guerrilla.
B. Membership in a Particular Social Group
An alien facing deportation may qualify for asylum if he is
threatened with persecution on account of his race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Per-
secution based on "membership in a particular social group" was first
accepted as a legitimate basis for asylum in the Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees.213 Its inclusion was fortuitous, considering
the original U.N. Committee did not recognize this ground when it
drafted the refugee definition. 214 The draftsmen intended the "social
group" criterion to cover any possible gap in the definition since it
was broader than the "race", "religion" or "nationality" compo-
nents. 21 5 The term itself is difficult to define. Authorities suggest that
it encompasses people of "similar background, habits or social sta-
tus"' 21 6 or people who share the same culture, language and educa-
tion.21 7 As the cases illustrate, this basis for political asylum does not
lend itself to easy application.
In Matter of Acosta,218 the BIA provided some guidance on the
construction of "membership in a particular social group." It looked
at the context in which the phrase appeared and found that each of
the persecution grounds dealt with an "immutable characteristic. ' ' 219
But the BIA was careful to explain that such a characteristic not only
had to be one that the alien was powerless to change, but also one that
he should not be required to change because of its fundamental
nature.220
In Acosta, the BIA did not regard members of a taxi cooperative
213. See Convention, supra note 15, art. I(A)(2).
214. A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 45, at 219. The U.N. Conference of Plenipotentaries
added the term. See UN. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and State-
less Persons, Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees [hereinafter UN. Conference],
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.2/SR.23, at 8 (1951).
215. A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 45, at 219.
216. HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 77.
217. Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. No. 2986, at 30 (BIA 1985); G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra
note 45, at 30.
218. Int. Dec. No. 2986 (BIA 1985).
219. Id. at 56. See also A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 45, at 217; G. GOODWIN-GILL,
supra note 45, at 30; Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group as a
Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39, 48 (1983).
220. Acosta, Int. Dec. No. 2986, at 31. See also Matter of Vigil, Int. Dec. No. 3050 (BIA
1988), where the BIA took the view that the factors in that case-age, living environment,
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in El Salvador to be members of a particular social group. 22 1 The
group had two common characteristics, namely driving a taxi and
failing to participate in the work stoppages organized by the guerril-
las. These characteristics did not meet the criterion of immutability
because the taxi drivers could either change their jobs or cooperate
with the guerrillas.
222
Occasionally, an alien will argue that violence against his family
is evidence that his life or freedom will be threatened. Some courts
have paid particular attention to the family's experience in trying to
assess the potential danger to the alien. For example, in Hernandez-
Ortiz v. INS,2 2 3 the court acknowledged that the alien had described
specific incidents of threats and violence to her family-"a small,
readily identifiable group. ' 224 The court did not decide whether the
alien's membership in this family unit was sufficient in itself to prove
her claim. However, it was certainly relevant to the question.
225
The attempt at defining the term "particular social group" has
been complicated by the fact that even the Handbook acknowledges
that mere membership in that group will not normally support a
claim for refugee status, absent special circumstances.226 Unfortu-
nately, the meaning of "special circumstances" is also unclear.
227
The definition of a "particular social group" must be limited to
some degree. Surely it cannot include every segment of a population
military status-are not factors that are "fundamental to individual identity or conscience."
Thus the alien's group did not qualify as a "particular social group." Id. at 5.
221. Acosta, Int. Dec. No. 2986, at 31-32.
222. Id. at 32.
223. 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985).
224. Id. at 516.
225. Id. at 515. See also Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1985); Maroufi v. INS,
772 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1985); Argueta v. INS, 759 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1985); Blum, supra
note 20, at 355.
226. See HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 79. "Mere membership of a particular social
group will not normally be enough to substantiate a claim to refugee status. However, there
may be special circumstances where mere membership can be a sufficient ground to fear perse-
cution." Id. See also Martinez-Romero v. INS, 692 F.2d 595, 596 (9th Cir. 1982).
227. Aliens have tried in many ways to show that their situation is peculiar. In Mendez-
Efrain v. INS, 813 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1987), there was some controversy over a land redistribu-
tion program in El Salvador through which the alien's family had received some land. The
alien believed himself in danger because other beneficiary families had bedn threatened and he
was the eldest son in his family. The court held that the alien could not be granted relief in the
absence of specific evidence that the previous landowners had targeted the alien's group. Id. at
282. See also Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285, 290 (9th Cir. 1984) (alien's status as
young, urban male not specific enough for asylum); Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431, 1434 (9th
Cir. 1984) (alien's assertions of potential persecution based on remote membership in union
not convincing and status as a young, urban male not specific enough for asylum).
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that has something in common. The confusion surrounding its scope
explains the difficulty which many aliens have encountered in
designating young, working class, urban males as a particular social
group. 228 Because this is a very broad group, courts find it difficult to
make someone eligible for refugee status on the basis of mere mem-
b6rship in this class.
No doubt there are certain situations where an alien's member-
ship will qualify him for relief. But in those cases where aliens have
alleged that persecution would be based on their status as young, ur-
ban males, they also assert that they would suffer because they had
not supported the guerrillas in El Salvador. In Sanchez-Trujillo v.
INS,229 aliens introduced evidence that the Salvadoran military
tended to be more suspicious of young males.230 This was not surpris-
ing because one would expect young males to be more active in polit-
ical opposition and more sympathetic to the rebel cause. But even
this possibility was a far cry from holding that youth and gender
alone should be the dispositive factors in any persecution scheme. 231
Since a group of "young, working class, urban males" includes so
many different kinds of people with different lifestyles and interests, it
would be pointless to try classifying them with any degree of particu-
larity. This group is simply a "demographic division" and the term,
"particular social group," should mean more than that. 23 2 A different
conclusion would allow any broad segment of the population to attain
refugee status once it was exposed to some serious risk of persecution
arising from general conditions of unrest.233
Nevertheless, in Castaneda-Hernandez v. INS,2 34 the Sixth Cir-
cuit asked the BIA to reconsider the case of a young Salvadoran be-
cause it thought that the BIA had not given much consideration to
the claim that the alien would be subject to persecution on the basis of
membership in a particular social group. The alien advanced the
traditional argument that the military would brand him as a subver-
sive because he had avoided military service. One affidavit attested to
the threat of persecution that hovered over young men who had left
228. See Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1984); Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d
1431 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1986).
229. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
230. Id. at 1577.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. A court can distinguish a particular social group from a demographic division only
by assessing the facts in a particular context. Id. at 1576 & n.7.
234. 826 F.2d 1526 (6th Cir. 1987).
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El Salvador because the government viewed them as conspirators
against the regime in power.235 The court was concerned that the
BIA had not taken this aspect seriously. In its decision, the Sixth
Circuit seemed to give future claimants hope that there may be some-
thing to this concept of a "particular social group."
Despite the Sixth Circuit's apparent optimism, no other court
has endorsed the theory that mere membership in a particular social
group will bring relief.2 36 Even where aliens allege that they will be
persecuted because they are young, urban males or members of some
particular family, courts eventually focus on the political opinion
component of asylum. 237 Admittedly, it may be relevant that an alien
is a young and vibrant opponent of the government. However, this
characterization only becomes important because the government
views the opponent in political terms. Therefore, the alien's claim
inevitably comes down to one involving persecution on account of
political opinion, which may arise from the alien's identification with
some organization. 238 Possibly, the special circumstances required for
a recognition of "social group" persecution really may involve the
235. Id. at 1528. The court was also concerned with the fact that the BIA may not have
complied with the more generous asylum standard of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421
(1987), but in remanding the case, the court also instructed the BIA to give a more thorough
review of the affidavits supporting the risky status of the young alien. Castaneda-Hernandez,
826 F.2d at 1531.
236. Castaneda-Hernandez, 826 F.2d at 1531.
237. In Cruz-Lopez v. INS, the alien defined the social group as "affluent students who
attend private schools, have relatives in the intelligentsia, have received direct threats against
their lives, and have friends and family members who have been singled out for persecution."
802 F.2d 1518, 1520 n.2 (4th Cir. 1986). The court expressed no opinion on whether the alien
properly identified the type of social group required by the statute. The court preferred to deal
with the alien's probability of persecution. Id. at 1521-22.
238. For example, in Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986), the alien
tried to convince the court of his vulnerability as a young, urban, working class male in El
Salvador. The Ninth Circuit stated as follows:
Although a substantial number of the victims have been young males-which would
hardly be surprising in any violent conflict-the IJ and the BIA reasonably found
that the evidence was inconclusive to establish that mere age and gender, even when
combined with labor class background, urban residence, or political neutrality, had
any bearing on the likelihood of persecution. Instead, the evidence indicates that the
risk of persecution relates principally to the existence of actual or imputed political
opinion.
Id. at 1577.
The court in Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985), took a similar ap-
proach. "The fact that there have been a number of threats or acts of violence against mem-
bers of an alien's family is sufficient to support the conclusion that the alien's life or freedom is
endangered." Id. at 515. The court added in a footnote: "Because of the conclusion we reach
regarding the political-opinion issue, we need not consider Hernandez-Ortiz's contention that
her family constitutes a 'social group' for purposes of section 243(h)." Id. at 517 n.8.
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political element. The persecutor's motivation for attacking some
young member of a particular social group may depend on the perse-
cutor's assessment of that group as a political threat to the govern-
ment. But, the alien will have difficulty proving that he will be
persecuted on account of mere membership in that group.
239
The aliens' "social group" rationale for relief likewise failed in
the recent case, Matter of Fuentes.24° The alien must have thought
that his case was strong enough to bring him within the special cir-
cumstances envisaged by the Handbook. 24' The alien was a former
member of the national police in El Salvador who feared persecution
by leftist insurgents there. At first blush, the BIA's position seemed
encouraging for the alien because it conceded that the alien's status as
a former policeman was an immutable characteristic, 242 which the
BIA had already prescribed as a necessary element of a "particular
social group. ' 243 Next, the BIA conceded the possibility that, in ap-
propriate circumstances, mistreating an alien because of his job as a
policeman could be persecution. 244 However, the alien was unable to
convince the BIA that he had satisfied the special circumstances
which would allow him to benefit from his identification with a partic-
ular social group. Moreover, the alien could not point to any exam-
ples of mistreatment that were tied to his status as a former
policeman.
245
Another disappointment awaited the alien in this case. The on-
going conflict in El Salvador made the BIA unwilling to characterize
a policeman or a guerrilla as a victim of persecution. This reluctance
239. See, e.g., Maroufi v. INS, 772 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1985); Chavarria v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 722 F.2d 666 (11th Cir. 1984); Shoaee v. INS, 704 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1983). In
Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985), the First Circuit was somewhat
sympathetic to the alien by recognizing that the facts of that case, if true, would qualify the
alien for section 243(h) relief on account of membership in a social group. The facts of the
case included "the house arrest of [the alien's] parents, the beating of her nephew, the seizure
of the family's bank account, the persecution of petitioner's tribe, social class, and political
persuasion." Id. at 626.
240. Int. Dec. No. 3065 (BIA 1988).
241. The Handbook makes this point: "Mere membership of a particular social group will
not normally be enough to substantiate a claim to refugee status. There may, however, be
special circumstances where mere membership can be a sufficient ground to fear persecution."
HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 79. See also Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285, 290
(9th Cir. 1984); Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431, 1434 (9th Cir. 1984); Blum, supra note 20, at
354.
242. Fuentes, Int. Dec. No. 3065, at 6.
243. Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. No. 2986, at 31 (BIA 1985).
244. Matter of Fuentes, Int. Dec. No. 3065, at 6 (BIA 1988).
245. Id.
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is understandable because if the BIA had accepted the proposition
that either side was victimizing the other, then all participants in
either camp would be ineligible for asylum or withholding because of
their characterization as "persecutors. ' 246 Such an expansive defini-
tion of persecution would have represented a definite policy shift
against the interest of aliens. As things now stand, aliens have a hard
enough time making their case. This new concept of persecution
would have worsened their plight.
Presently, the courts are reluctant to grant asylum or withhold-
ing relief to an alien based on persecution caused by the alien's mem-
bership in a particular social group. Even if a court accepts the
argument that the alien is a member of a particular social group, the
alien still must establish a nexus between his membership and the al-
leged persecution. This has proved difficult to do.
IV. A QUESTION OF ELIGIBILITY: PARTICULARLY
SERIOUS CRIME
Section 243(h) requires the Attorney General to withhold the de-
portation of certain aliens.247 Among the statutory exceptions is one
that denies relief if the Attorney General determines that "the alien,
having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious
crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United States. '248
This language comes from article 33.2 of the U.N. Convention, 249 and
although the draftsmen discussed the ramifications of that provision,
they did not leave any clear statement as to its meaning. Therefore, in
answering the basic question whether there must be both a finding
that the alien has been convicted and a finding that he is a danger to
the community, courts have relied on their own interpretation of the
language. Courts have held that no need exists for two findings be-
cause the alien's conviction of a particularly serious crime means that
the alien is dangerous to the community. 250 Thus, both the courts
246. Id. at 5-6. The Attorney General will not grant asylum or deportation withholding
relief if the alien "participated in the persecution of any person on account of... membership
in a particular social group." Immigration & Nationality Act §§ 243(h)(2)(B), 208(a),
101(a)(42)(B), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1253(h)(2)(B), 1158(a), 1101(a)(42)(B) (1988).
247. Immigration & Nationality Act § 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988).
248. Id. § 243(h)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B).
249. Convention, supra note 15, art. 33.2.
250. Arauz v. Rivkind, 845 F.2d 271 (1 1th Cir. 1988); Ramirez-Ramos v. INS, 814 F.2d
1394 (9th Cir. 1987); Crespo-Gomez v. Richard, 780 F.2d 932 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Matter of
Carballe, Int. Dec. No. 3007 (BIA 1986).
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and the BIA believe that there is a cause and effect relationship be-
tween convictions and dangerousness.
Section 243(h) requires the Attorney General to assess the pres-
ent dangerousness of an alien who has been convicted. 25 The phrase,
"having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious
crime," follows "the alien. ' 252 Therefore, the Attorney General
should not make any determination unless he is dealing with a con-
victed alien. This suggests that there should be two findings: one of
conviction, and the other of dangerousness. The statute requires the
Attorney General to judge whether the alien shall remain in the
United States. Among other things, he should consider the effect of
the alien's conviction on the community. If Congress wanted to
equate conviction with dangerousness, it could have made relief un-
available to any alien who has been convicted. The fact that section
243(h) includes both provisions suggests that there is no direct rela-
tionship between conviction and dangerousness. Reading the section
to make an alien's conviction enough to exclude him from relief ren-
ders the "danger" component surplusage. It also shifts the emphasis
from the Attorney General's determination that the convicted alien is
a community threat, to a simple conclusion that the alien has been
convicted of a particularly serious crime. Surely, Congress did not
intend this result.
The BIA recently interpreted the statute in Matter of Carballe.253
The BIA decided that "the Act does not require two separate and
distinct factual findings [to] be made in order to render an alien ineli-
gible for withholding of deportation. ' ' 25 4 The BIA agreed that the
INS had to show that the alien was a danger to the community and
that the statute provided the necessary guidance on that determina-
tion.255 But, the BIA believed that the alien's conviction made the
alien only "presumptively" dangerous. 256 One could have hoped for a
clearer explanation than that. Apparently, the alien would have the
opportunity to overcome the presumption. That opportunity would
support the proposition that dangerousness is not an indispensable el-
251. The alien's deportation cannot be withheld if the Attorney General "determines that
the alien . . . constitutes a danger to the community of the United States." Immigration &
Nationality Act § 243(h)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B) (1988) (emphasis added).
252. Id.
253. Int. Dec. No. 3007 (BIA 1986).
254. Id. at 4.
255. Id. at 4-5.
256. Id. at 5.
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ement of a serious crime.257
The INS argued against a "two findings" requirement, relying on
the legislative history of section 243(h) for support. A congressional
report noted that an exception exists for "aliens ... who have been
convicted of particularly serious crimes which make them a danger to
the community of the United States. ' 258 This language does not sup-
port the INS position because it clearly limits the disqualifying crimes
to those which put the community in danger.259 That language does
not suggest that all "particularly serious crimes" automatically fall
into that category.
Some courts are apprehensive about requiring a determination of
an alien's danger to the community. 26° This concept is not foreign to
the INA since, in the same section, there is another exception which
denies relief if the Attorney General determines that "there are rea-
sonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the security of
the United States."'261 This exception is even more troublesome be-
cause the only limitation on this determination of an alien's danger-
ousness is a "reasonable grounds" basis.
262
257. The BIA must have rejected this possibility. In any event, the BIA did not deal with
the requirement that the alien must be dangerous to the "community." The ninety-year-old
man who murders his gravely ill wife because they both want to end her suffering can hardly
be said to be a danger to the community. Yet there is a powerful argument that this murder
would be a "particularly serious crime." Or if one concedes the commission of such a crime
and then the alien becomes totally physically disabled, one would have a hard time showing
the alien's danger to the community.
258. H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979).
259. There is a difference between the language "aliens ... who have been convicted of
particularly serious crimes, which makes them a danger to the community," and the language
of the report. The report language suggests that there must be a finding that the conviction is
one that makes the alien dangerous, while the former regards the conviction itself as including
the finding of dangerousness. Cf. Anker, supra note 16, at 51. One author has stated that
"[c]onsidering significantly egregious behavior, such as the commission of a serious criminal
act which makes the applicant a substantial threat to the community, is relevant to the exercise
of discretion in asylum." Id. This language identifies the relevant act as one that makes the
alien a danger to the community. While the district director must deny asylum if the alien has
been convicted of a particularly serious crime, 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(1)(iv) (1989), the immigra-
tion judge and the BIA may use their discretion despite the alien's convictions. Castro-
O'Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988).
260. See, e.g., Zardui-Quintana v. Richard, 768 F.2d 1213, 1222-23 (11th Cir. 1985)
(Vance, J., concurring).
261. Immigration & Nationality Act § 1253(h)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(D) (1988).
262. The INA requires the exercise of reasonable judgment. For example, an alien "whom
the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reasonable ground to believe proba-
bly would ... engage ... in other activity subversive to the national security" can be excluded
from the United States. Immigration & Nationality Act § 212(a)(29), 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(29)
(1988). There is little reason to fear the difficulty involved in judging an alien's dangerousness,
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L[V
A similar phrase caused concern during the drafting stage of the
Convention. The delegate from the Holy See was uncomfortable with
it until the United Kingdom delegate explained that states must have
the leeway to determine whether there were "sufficient grounds for
regarding any refugee as a danger to the security of the country.
'263
Since the delegates were concerned that states should have flexibility
in balancing their security interests with genuine needs of refugees,
they focused on identifying criminals who not only represented secur-
ity problems, but had a propensity for infecting the community.
264
The requirement of a conviction for a "particularly serious
crime" provides a better guide to determining an alien's dangerous-
ness. If the INS finds it difficult to assess an alien's dangerousness in
one exception, then it should have the same difficulty in the other.
Although courts have denied the necessity of making a dangerousness
assessment once a conviction has been proved, one must wonder why
some of the same courts find it necessary to uphold the BIA's opinion
on this same ground. For example, in Mahini v. INS,265 the Ninth
Circuit agreed with the BIA that the alien's drug dealing was a partic-
ularly serious crime. However, the court further stated that the BIA
was correct in ruling that the alien was a danger to the community
because of "heroin's deleterious effect on people. '2 66 If a dual finding
of conviction and dangerousness was unnecessary, the BIA should
have considered only the conviction in denying relief to the alien. The
important issue was whether the alien had committed a particularly
serious crime. Apparently, the court wanted to justify the BIA's deci-
sion regarding the alien's dangerousness, not merely to relate it to the
seriousness of the crime, but because the statute required that finding.
Had the court been content to rely solely on the conviction as auto-
matic proof of dangerousness, it would not have had to assure us that
"the Board did not err in ruling that the petitioner constituted a dan-
ger to the community within the meaning of section 243(h)(2)(B)" of
even if it involves assessing the alien's potential for recidivism. If an alien faces possible death
upon returning to his native country, avoiding the alien's petition on the basis of administra-
tive convenience is insufficient. Judge Vance's concerns for the practical problems involved in
making the dual findings under section 243(h)(2)(B) were somewhat exaggerated. See Zardui-
Quintana, 768 F.2d at 1222-23 (Vance, J., concurring).
263. U.N. Conference, supra note 214, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.2/SR.16, at 7-8.
264. See id. at 7 (French delegate argued for a distinction between undesirable elements
and genuine refugees).
265. 779 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1986).
266. Id. at 1421.
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the Refugee Act. 267
The Ninth Circuit had another opportunity in Ramirez-Ramos v.
INS268 to interpret section 243(h)(2)(B). The seriousness of the crime
was undisputed. 269 However, the fortuitous convergence of the two
factors in these drug cases-the seriousness of the crime and the dan-
ger to the community--did not establish the permanent cause and
effect relationship sought by the Ramirez-Ramos court. Yet the court
persisted in its denial of a two-step requirement because the statute
excludes from relief those dangerous aliens "who have been finally
convicted of serious crimes. '270 Though it was reasonable, this posi-
tion failed to support the court's conclusion that the alien was a dan-
ger to the community because he was convicted of a particularly
serious crime. It is one thing to say that the statute requires the At-
torney General to look for dangerous aliens among the convicted
only, but it is quite another to say that a conviction automatically
leads to a finding of dangerousness. Unfortunately, the court in Ra-
mirez-Ramos thought it was upholding the automatic connection
when it accepted the proposition limiting the category of dangerous
aliens to those who were convicted criminals. 271
The court must have been troubled by its position in Mahini
where it sanctioned the BIA's explanation of the relationship between
267. Id. By finding that the BIA did not err on this point, the court implied that the BIA
had to make a finding that the alien was dangerous. It is doubtful that this separate finding
would be required if the BIA found the commission of a particularly serious crime.
268. 814 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1987).
269. Id. at 1397. An alien is deportable for being a drug addict. Immigration & National-
ity Act § 241(a)(1 1), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1988). The statute does not even require a con-
viction. If an alien is convicted, he cannot benefit from a judicial recommendation against
deportation that would be available to aliens who are convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude. Id. § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b). In other words, Congress regards involvement
with drugs as such a serious matter that no waiver from deportation exists unless conviction is
for a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marihuana. In addition, the
alien must have a prescribed close family relationship with a citizen or lawful permanent resi-
dent, separation from whom would cause extreme hardship, in order to avoid deportation.
Even then, the Attorney General has discretion to grant the waiver. Id. § 241(f)(2), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(f)(2).
270. Ramirez-Ramos, 814 F.2d at 1397.
271. Id. This limitation is reasonable, but it does not follow that all aliens who have com-
mitted particularly serious crimes constitute a danger to the community. The statute can be
interpreted to mean that the Attorney General must look for the dangerous aliens among
convicts only. In commenting on Convention article 33.2, one author has said that -[a]s to the
second group of 'dangerous persons,' they comprise only cases of a final judicial decision in
particularly serious crimes." N. ROBINSON, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES: ITS HISTORY, CONTENTS AND INTERPRETATION 164 (1953) (footnote omitted).
Therefore, the alien must first be a convict in order to qualify for the group.
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the heroin seller and his dangerous impact on the community. 272 Be-
cause the BIA ruled that the alien was a danger to the community
within the meaning of section 243(h)(2)(B), the court may have been
concerned that this "danger" element would be viewed as a separate
requirement. The court in Ramirez-Ramos side-stepped this issue by
treating the BIA's explanation about the heroin menace as a gratui-
to gesLLL. thLaL, UlUd InoL cIvei L eL1 s atL-LUie 11 a Lwo-step
procedure.
273
In Crespo-Gomez v. Richard,274 an Eleventh Circuit case, the
alien was convicted of cocaine possession and there was no disagree-
ment about the seriousness of the crime. The court refused to make
two separate findings because the two clauses of the statute were not
connected by a conjunction. 275 Had Congress clearly stated that the
alien must be convicted of a particularly serious crime and be a dan-
ger to the community, there would be little room for disagreement.
Clearly, this case exemplifies the sometimes inconsistent results of
statutory interpretation. The question is whether one can find a re-
quirement of two separate findings even without the word "and." The
court seemed rather confident that "the only finding required by [sec-
tion 243(h)(2)(B)] is that the alien has been convicted of a 'particu-
larly serious crime.' ",276 One might be just as confident in making the
observation that the statute requires the Attorney General to deter-
mine that "the alien ... constitutes a danger to the community of the
United States. '2 77 Therefore, in the interest of consistency, the court
should not have substituted a statutory determination about criminal
conduct for a finding about the alien's danger to the community and,
simultaneously, insisted that a conjunction was the only way to sus-
tain the requirement of two findings.
Congress knew full well how to impress an alien with the conse-
quences of criminal conduct since an alien may be deported if he is
272. See Mahini v. INS, 779 F.2d 1419, 1421 (9th Cir. 1986).
273. Ramirez-Ramos v. INS, 814 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1987). In Mahini, the BIA
must have realized that a determination about the alien's danger to the community was neces-
sary. But, under section 243(h)(2)(B), denial of relief is dictated only if the statutory determi-
nation is made concerning a convicted alien. Pursuant to the statute, the Attorney General
determines whether the alien constitutes a danger to the community of the United States after
the alien is convicted. Immigration & Nationality Act § 243(h)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h)(2)(B) (1988).
274. 780 F.2d 932 (11th Cir. 1986).
275. Id. at 934. See also Ramirez-Ramos v. INS, 814 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1987).
276. Crespo-Gomez, 780 F.2d at 934-35.
277. Immigration & Nationality Act § 243(h)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B) (1988).
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"convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within
five years after entry. '278 This deportation language is closer to the
Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of section 243(h)(2)(B) than the ac-
tual language of the section. The court offered no explanation for the
differences in language in the two sections. If Congress had wanted to
restrict the inquiry to a finding of criminal conviction, it could have
used language that definitively would have done so. The court in Cre-
spo-Gomez suggested that the presence of a conjunction in the statute
was the only way to require two findings.279 Arguably, Congress used
different language in section 243(h)(2)(B) to require something more
than a single finding.
280
It is possible for a convicted alien to present no danger to the
community. If not, then the courts' interpretation requiring only one
finding-conviction of a serious crime-would be valid. One reason-
able interpretation of the statute is that the Attorney General must
determine the alien's dangerousness as long as he is dealing with a
convicted alien. The government should not apply the section
mechanically once it has obtained a conviction, without pausing to
reflect on the alien's current danger to others.
281
It is noteworthy that the grounds of ineligibility for withholding
of deportation do not parallel those of asylum. However, by regula-
tion, the district director must also deny asylum if the alien has been
convicted of a particularly serious crime.282 The regulation does not
affect the discretion of the immigration judge or of the BIA. Once the
alien is in exclusion or deportation proceedings, he may reapply for
asylum, subject to the discretion of the immigration judge. 283 The
278. Id. § 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4).
279. Crespo-Gomez v. Richard, 780 F.2d 932, 934 (1986).
280. If conviction for a particularly serious crime means that the alien is a danger to the
community, then Congress could simply have required conviction as the disqualifying element
in the statute. Congress' approach makes the conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
a deportable ground. Compare Immigration & Nationality Act § 243(h)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h)(2)(B) (1988), with Immigration & Nationality Act § 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 125 l(a)(4)
(1988). If conviction is the sole determinant for applying the exception, the language concern-
ing the danger to the community is redundant.
281. One author states that
[i]t is unclear to what extent, if at all, one convicted of a particularly serious crime
must also be shown to constitute a danger to the community. The jurisprudence is
sparse, and the notion of 'particularly serious crime' is not a term of art, but princi-
ples of natural justice and due process of law require something more than mere
mechanical application of the exception.
G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 45, at 96 (footnote omitted).
282. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(l)(iv) (1989).
283. Id. § 208.9.
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alien may maintain his petition for asylum even upon the denial of
withholding relief.2 84 Therefore, after an unfavorable withholding de-
cision, the immigration judge must still consider the evidence support-
ing the alien's asylum claim. The alien's conviction for a particularly
serious crime does not excuse the immigration judge from considering
the merits.28 5 While he may take the conviction into account, the
juuge uitL us cafe1u not to conve- L hi dis.i... a- .. a.u . baLiu U IbI L;I UI IL L.U.I a
because of the alien's conviction. The judge or the BIA must make
findings to support the decision on the alien's asylum claim so that
there is an adequate basis for review. 286
The confusion over the ineligibility grounds for asylum and with-
holding cases prompted one court to remind the BIA that the BIA
could not take away an alien's right to present all his evidence simply
because it thought that the immigration judge had no obligation to
consider the evidence in the face of the alien's conviction. In that
case, Shahandeh-Pey v. INS,2 87 the Seventh Circuit remanded the
case, giving the alien the chance to overcome any of the negative fac-
tors affecting his petition. The court refused to accept the BIA's deci-
sion when the BIA did not even attempt to consider all aspects of the
case.2 8 8 Since the BIA did not explain its reasons for denying discre-
tionary relief, the court could not reasonably assume that the BIA
had adequately considered the alien's evidence.2 89 Further, the immi-
284. The standard for withholding deportation is higher than that for asylum. Compare
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984), with INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). There-
fore, even if an alien cannot meet the "clear probability" standard of Stevic, he may be able to
show a "well-founded fear" of persecution. The BIA's view is that the asylum claim should be
reviewed first because of the lower standard of proof. If the alien obtains asylum, the courts
need not consider withholding deportation. See Matter of Mogharrabi, Int. Dec. No. 3028
(BIA 1987). However, the Ninth Circuit has opted for the reverse procedure. See Blanco-
Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1987); Turcios v. INS, 829 F.2d 720 (9th Cir.
1987).
285. While the district director must deny asylum if the alien has been convicted of a
particular serious crime, 8 C.F.R. 208.8(f)(l)(iv) (1988), there is no similar provision control-
ling the immigration judge. See Arauz v. Rivkind, 845 F.2d 271 (1 Ith Cir. 1988); Matter of
Gonzalez, Int. Dec. No. 3071 (BIA 1988). An alien may be granted asylum at the Attorney
General's discretion if the alien is a refugee. Immigration & Nationality Act § 208(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) (1988). There is no specific provision preventing a criminal from coming within the
term "refugee."
286. Castro-O'Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Shahandeh-Pey
v. INS, 831 F.2d 1384 (7th Cir. 1987); Matter of Pula, Int. Dec. No. 3033 (BIA 1987).
287. 831 F.2d 1384 (7th Cir. 1987).
288. Id. at 1388.
289. Id. "At no point in the opinion did the board say that regardless of the favorable
factors which the petitioner did-or could have presented, the negative factors could not be
overcome." Id.
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gration judge had thought that the alien was statutorily ineligible for
relief because of the alien's conviction.
In Matter of Gonzalez,290 the BIA held that aliens who are statu-
torily ineligible for withholding of deportation on criminal grounds,
nevertheless have a right to a full evidentiary hearing when applying
for asylum. In recognizing this right, the BIA has rejected the prac-
tice of pretermitting asylum applications of aliens convicted of partic-
ularly serious crimes. 291 This is an encouraging development because
it confirms the role that the immigration judge and the BIA must play
in assessing the true nature of the harm the alien faces abroad. It is
only by providing this opportunity for separate review that the hu-
manitarian features of asylum will be preserved. 292 Even though the
alien may have committed a particularly serious crime, the adjudica-
tors of his case should consider the danger that awaits the alien so as
to make a complete evaluation of the alien's circumstances. If certain
death or torture awaits the alien upon return to his native country,
the immigration judge or the BIA ought to hear about it before ruling
on the discretionary asylum remedy. 293 Otherwise, the alien's convic-
tion would become the only criterion for ineligibility and there would
be no opportunity for the exercise of discretion.
The BIA's decision in Matter of Gonzalez is in line with the cur-
rent judicial trend in this area.294 This current trend interjects an ele-
ment of reality in the asylum process, but it remains to be seen
whether subsequent decisions will produce any real change in the final
outcome of asylum petitions. After considering all of the alien's evi-
dence, the immigration judge still must face the government's claim
that the alien is a danger to the community because of his conviction.
Therefore, the immigration judge must have the discretion to decide
whether the alien is currently a danger to the community, in spite of
the alien's commission of a particularly serious crime.
V. SOME DIFFICULTIES FOR THE ALIEN
A. The Discretionary Element
Although many aliens choose asylum, some scholars have voiced
290. Int. Dec. No. 3071 (BIA 1988).
291. Id. at 5-6.
292. Id. at 7 (Heilman, BIA member, concurring).
293. Id. at 5.
294. See Castro-O'Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1987); Arauz v. Rivkind, 845
F.2d 271 (1lth Cir. 1988); Shahandeh-Pey v. INS, 831 F.2d 1384 (7th Cir. 1988).
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reservations about its discretionary element. 295 This is understanda-
ble, for it must be disconcerting indeed for an alien to convince the
government of his well-founded fear of persecution only to discover
that the government has denied relief in the exercise of its discretion.
This can be especially unsettling when the alien has failed to meet the
higher standard for withholding deportation and therefore is left with-
c t anv remi-dv if the gnvernment exercises it- dirrtinn naninst him
The elements weighed by the government in its exercise of discre-
tion are unclear but certain factors are gaining importance as asylum
applications increase. For instance, in Matter of Salim,296 the BIA
made clear its disapproval of the alien's fraudulent entry and circum-
vention of the normal refugee procedures. In particular, it found the
circumvention of refugee procedures to be "an extremely adverse fac-
tor which [could] only be overcome with the most unusual showing of
countervailing equities. ' 297 Thus, even if an alien escaped the dangers
of his homeland, he still had to argue (with the most unusual show-
ing) the fairness of his jumping the refugee queue.
By focusing on the alien's fraud under section 212(a)(19)298 and
the alien's evasion of the normal refugee procedures in Salim, perhaps
the BIA wanted to avoid providing an incentive for aliens to profit
from a violation of the law. However, the BIA seemed to go beyond
reasonable measures in setting the ground rules. It did not treat the
alien's avoidance of the procedures as merely "adverse" but "ex-
tremely adverse." The alien was required to make not merely a
"showing" of equities on the other side, but a "most unusual show-
ing." 299 The BIA's tough stance was perhaps an admirable approach,
but surely unrealistic.
After Salim, the BIA heard another case involving fraud and cir-
cumvention of the ordinary refugee procedures, Matter of Shirdel.300
In Shirdel, the BIA quickly assured the alien that even if no fraud
295. See Anker, supra note 16, at 16; Helton, The Proper Role of Discretion in Political
Asylum Determinations, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 999, 1019 (1985).
296. 18 1. & N. Dec. 311 (1982).
297. Id. at 316.
298. The alien conceded a violation of section 212(a)(19) of the INA by arriving in the
United States with a fraudulent passport. Id. at 315-16. See Immigration & Nationality Act
§ 212(a)(19), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1988). The BIA found the alien qualified for both with-
holding of deportation under INA § 243(h) and asylum under INA § 208. However, the BIA
then had to decide whether it would grant asylum as a matter of discretion. Salim, 18 I. & N.
Dec. at 314.
299. Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 316.
300. Int. Dec. No. 2958 (BIA 1984).
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existed, there was still no guaranty of asylum. 301 In its view, the criti-
cal factor for denying relief rested on the alien's improper subversion
of the refugee procedures abroad. 30 2 The BIA was upset that the alien
had used smugglers to help him reach the United States after he had
already escaped from the country of persecution. 30 3 More impor-
tantly, the BIA relied on the State Department's opinion which ad-
vised that the alien's application should be rejected because of the
alien's attempt to gain an advantage over other refugees.
Since Salim and Shirdel involved both fraud and circumvention
of refugee procedures, one might hold out hope for an alien whose
only transgression was of the latter kind. In Matter of Gharadaghi,30 4
there was no finding of fraud, and the alien tried to distinguish his
case from Salim on that basis. The BIA, however, did not see the
distinction. It did not view the absence of a finding of fraud as a
positive feature. In other words, a finding of fraud might have hurt
the alien, but lack of it certainly did not help him. In the BIA's view,
even though there was no fraud, the alien beoefitted from a false pass-
port and a smuggler in circumventing the prescribed procedures. 30 5
In Gharadaghi, the BIA balanced the positive and negative fac-
tors. Among the persuasive factors were the alien's good fortune in
escaping from Iran, finding safe haven in Pakistan, later obtaining
temporary respite in Canada (where he also received financial aid
from the government), 30 6 and an overriding objective to join his im-
mediate family in the United States. 30 7 The BIA found it difficult to
identify equities which might counterbalance the alien's rejection of
the orderly refugee procedures. 30 8 In sum, Salim and Shirdel left a
mixed message about the combination of fraud and circumvention of
301. Id. at 7.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 8. The BIA seemed to suggest that it would look more kindly on an alien's
subterfuge if the alien was trying to escape the land of persecution. But having made his
escape, the alien could not then jump the queue by fraudulent means.
304. Int. Dec. No. 3001 (BIA 1985).
305. Id. at 6.
306. Id.
307. Interestingly, none of Gharadaghi's family were lawful permanent residents or citi-
zens of the United States. As a matter of fact, each of them was also applying for asylum. Id.
at 7.
308. In Gharadaghi, the BIA required the alien to show "sufficient countervailing equi-
ties" for a favorable decision. Id. at 5. This was more liberal than the Salim requirement of
"the most unusual showing of countervailing equities." See Matter of Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec.
311, 316 (1982).
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orderly procedures, and Gharadaghi made the latter factor the domi-
nant theme in the discretionary exercise.
It was not until Matter of Pula 309 that the BIA retreated from its
Salim position. Although it still treated the circumvention of refugee
procedures as a serious matter, it did not take the extreme position of
restricting asylum to the most unusual situations due solely to that
element to be weighed in the balance. 310
Before diluting the effect of the alien's misconduct in Pula, the
BIA rejected the alien's argument that section 208 prevented the At-
torney General from considering the alien's manner of entry. 311 The
alien sought to tie the language "irrespective of such alien's status" to
the Attorney General's grant of asylum. 312 As such, there could be
no consideration of the alien's method of entry because it would be
irrelevant to the alien's eligibility for asylum under section 208. The
BIA disagreed, interpreting the clause simply as ensuring that asylum
applications would be accepted from aliens physically present in the
United States, or at a land border or port of entry, "irrespective of
such alien's status. ' 313 However, nothing prevented the Attorney
General from considering the alien's status as a factor in his decision
on asylum. 314 Although the alien failed to get his status excluded en-
tirely from consideration, at least the BIA retreated from its former
position which had made it almost impossible for an alien to profit
from an irregular entry.
While retreating from the Salim proposition that the circumven-
tion of orderly refugee procedures was enough to require unusual
counterbalancing equities, the BIA did advocate an examination of
the circumstances of the alien's flight from persecution. 31 5 The BIA
309. Int. Dec. No. 3033 (BIA 1987).
310. Id. at 9.
311. Id. at 8-9.
312. The statute provides that
(t]he Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present in
the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such alien's
status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of
the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee
within the meaning of section 1 101(a)(42)(A) of this title.
Immigration & Nationality Act § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
313. Int. Dec. No. 3033, at 8. The BIA noted that section 208 contains two independent
clauses connected by the conjunction "and." The alien wanted to interpret the language so
that "irrespective of such alien's status" was tied to the second clause rather than the first. Id.
314. Id. at 9.
315. Matter of Pula, Int. Dec. No. 3033, at 9 (BIA 1985).
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took this position because it wanted to use its discretion in deciding
whether the alien could find a safe haven in another country. If the
alien's fraud remained the overriding consideration, the BIA could
not exercise true discretion in deciding on the alien's application for
relief. Thus, the length of the alien's stay in another country, the
alien's potential for permanent residence there, and whether the alien
had the opportunity to apply for asylum elsewhere may be relevant
considerations. This is clearly different from insisting that any con-
tact with a third country should be a negative factor in asylum
cases.
3 16
It is also encouraging that in Pula the BIA favored the considera-
tion of humanitarian factors in the discretionary determination.
31 7
This is important because an alien may meet the statutory require-
ment for asylum, but fail the more stringent standard for withholding
deportation. Should the alien fail the standard for withholding depor-
tation, the discretionary factors become the only barrier between the
alien and deportation to a foreign land. The BIA's call for a careful
evaluation of discretionary factors was understandable in light of the
harsh consequences which might await the alien on deportation. It is
sensible that "the danger of persecution should generally outweigh all
but the most egregious of adverse factors. 31 8 This approach recog-
nizes asylum as a mechanism for protecting the alien from persecu-
tion, and leads to the presumption that the alien will qualify for
discretionary relief in the absence of negative evidence.
The BIA, however, has not found it possible to reject the alien's
method of entry as one of the discretionary factors in asylum adjudi-
cation. The BIA can make a commitment to the safe haven principle
by demonstrating less interest in the alien's manner of entry, and con-
centrating instead on the alien's avoidance of persecution. Aliens who
produce evidence of persecution should have a reasonable chance of
relief despite the use of false documents. The threat of persecution in
asylum cases should be given the same priority as family ties in sus-
pension of deportation cases. 319
316. Id.
317. Id. at 10.
318. Id.
319. See Anker, supra note 16, at 46. Elsewhere in the statutory framework, aliens who
have established certain ties in the United States can find relief despite certain negative factors.
See Immigration & Nationality Act § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1988) (suspension of depor-
tation); Immigration & Nationality Act § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1988) (adjustment of
status). Also, in Pula, the BIA looked favorably on the alien's family ties in the United States.
Matter of Pula, Int. Dec. No. 3033, at II (BIA 1987). However, in Gharadaghi, the BIA
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Today, one may only guess how far the BIA will go in giving the
protection element of asylum the prominence it deserves. 320 In the
meantime, the BIA recently made a further pronouncement on the
discretionary element.
In Matter of Soleimani,321 the BIA held that an alien's firm reset-
tlement in another country did not preclude relief, but was only one
factor to be taken into account in the exercise of discretion. 32 2 The
BIA pointed out that firm resettlement was a statutory hindrance to
the admission of refugees located outside the United States but not to
the granting of asylum to aliens within the United States.3 23 The BIA
also reminded the parties that although a regulation prohibited asy-
lum to aliens who were firmly resettled in a foreign country, it only
applied to district directors and not to immigration judges or the
BIA. 324  The BIA concluded that the firm resettlement concept
played no part in the definition of a refugee and that Congress intro-
duced the resettlement element to preclude the admission of an alien
as a refugee from outside the United States. 325
The Soleimani decision also reinforced the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" approach from Matter of Pula, requiring the immigra-
tion judge to consider the whole picture before deciding the alien's
fate. The BIA's flexible position on the issue of firm resettlement was
seemed to take a dim view that "[r]ather than fleeing persecution, per se, the applicant's over-
riding purpose in seeking admission to this country [was] reunification with his immediate
family." Matter of Gharadaghi, Int. Dec. No. 3001, at 5-6 (BIA 1985).
320. Arguably, the asylum statute recognizes this protection element when it uses the lan-
guage, "irrespective of such alien's status." Immigration & Nationality Act § 208(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) (1988). The majority in Pula only applied this language to the asylum petitioning
procedures. In other words, the Attorney General had to establish an asylum application
procedure that was available to any alien. However, the actual asylum decision could still take
the alien's status into account. Int. Dec. No. 3033, at 8-9. BIA member Heilman thought the
majority's interpretation made the phrase redundant and preferred to relate the language to
the alien who was being considered for asylum status, reading the phrase as describing the
alien rather than the procedure. He believed the alien's status had little to do with the Attor-
ney General's exercise of discretion because the asylum provisions were "humanitarian" in
nature. Id. at 12-13 (Heilman, BIA member, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
321. Int. Dec. No. 3118 (BIA 1989).
322. Id. at 6-7.
323. Id. at 8. The statute provides that the Attorney General may admit any refugee who
is not firmly resettled in any foreign country. Immigration & Nationality Act § 2 07(c)(1), 8
U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1) (1988).
324. Soleimani, Int. Dec. No. 3118, at 8. The regulation requires the district director to
deny an asylum request if the alien has been firmly resettled in a foreign country. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.8(f)(1)(ii) (1989).
325. Matter of Soleimani, Int. Dec. No. 3118, at 9 (BIA 1989).
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encouraging. Specifically, the BIA will not find an alien to have
firmly resettled in a third country if
[i]t is shown that his physical presence in the United States is a
consequence of his flight in search of refuge, and that his physical
presence is reasonably proximate to the flight and not one follow-
ing a flight remote in point of time or interrupted by an intervening
residence in a third country reasonably constituting a termination
of the original flight in search of refuge.326
This approach is consistent with the BIA's thinking in Matter of
Pula327 because the alien's actions in fleeing the country where he
feared persecution were more important than the mere circumvention
of refugee procedures. The BIA therefore has ensured that the sole
determinant of firm resettlement will not be the alien's stopover in a
third country en route to the United States, even if that country of-
fered the alien permanent residence.
In sum, the BIA confirmed the element of discretion not only in
deciding whether an alien had become firmly resettled, but also in
deciding whether the resettlement itself should prevent the alien from
gaining asylum. In this respect, the decision should give asylum-seek-
ers cause for optimism.
B. The Stowaway and the Security Risk
An alien who arrives in the United States as a stowaway has an
irregular status which subjects him to summary treatment. He is not
entitled to a hearing and he may be excluded without a hearing. 328
There is an important question whether a stowaway can benefit from
the regular asylum procedure, including the right to renew his appli-
cation in exclusion proceedings if he is denied asylum.
The Second Circuit decided the stowaway asylum issue in Yiu
Sing Chun v. Sava.329  The court framed the issue this way:
"[w]hether . . . the petitioners, arriving at a port of entry as
stowaways, are entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge on
the issue whether they are refugees within the meaning of the Act,
and therefore entitled to asylum. ' ' 330 The government argued that
326. Id. at It.
327. Int. Dec. No. 3033 (BIA 1987).
328. Stowaways are excludable from the United States. Immigration & Nationality Act
§ 212(a)(18), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(18) (1988). Unlike most other excludable aliens, stowaways
are not entitled to a hearing. Id. § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).
329. 708 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1983).
330. Id. at 872 (footnote omitted).
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section 273(d) of the INA finalized the district director's order of ex-
clusion and his denial of asylum. 33' Therefore, the INS contended
that these stowaways could not assert their asylum claims in an exclu-
sion proceeding before an immigration judge because they were not
otherwise entitled to such a hearing under other provisions of the
INA.
3 3 2
The court strained its reading of the INA so that section 273(d)
covering stowaways could be read consistently with the asylum provi-
sions. The court noted that section 208(a) made it possible for an
alien at the border to apply for asylum "irrespective of such alien's
status, ' 333 and that INS regulations themselves provide for an exclu-
sion hearing before an immigration judge if the district director denies
the alien's asylum application. 334 In light of this, the court allowed
stowaways the same procedural rights as other asylum applicants,
while also affirming the limitations of section 273(d) for stowaways in
other contexts. 335
The result in Chun did not satisfy the BIA. In a similar case,
Matter of Waldei,336 the district director denied the stowaway's re-
quest for asylum and put the stowaway in exclusion proceedings
before an immigration judge. As expected, the stowaway renewed his
331. Id. at 874. The statute provides in relevant part that "[tihe provisions of section 1225
of this title for detention of aliens for examination before special inquiry officers and the right
of appeal provided for in section 1226 of this title shall not apply to aliens who arrive as
stowaways ...." Immigration & Nationality Act § 273(d), 8 U.S.C. 1323(d) (1988).
332. Chun, 708 F.2d at 874.
333. Id. (citing Immigration & Nationality Act § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988)).
Although the alien was excludable as a stowaway under section 212(a)(18), that section al-
lowed the court to look elsewhere because of the language "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
this chapter." It is otherwise provided in section 208(a) that an alien may apply for asylum
"irrespective of such alien's status." Immigration & Nationality Act § 208(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) (1988).
334. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9 (1989).
335. Yiu Sing Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1983). Arguably, this decision
provides an incentive for aliens to use the stowaway mechanism to get a better shot at asylum.
After all, the alien who is denied refugee status at an American consulate abroad has no right
to appeal. The court's response was that Congress itself had distinguished between refugees
and asylees. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a), 1158(a) (1988)). In a later case, a district court, in
following Chun, said that "[t]his holding hardly encourages stowaways." Guo-Jun Cheng v.
Ilchert, 698 F. Supp. 825, 826 (N.D. Cal. 1988). See also Fang-Sui You v. Gustafson, 623 F.
Supp. 1515 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
These cases simply recognize the fact that asylum seekers are specially protected. In Mat-
ter of Pula, Int. Dec. No. 3033 (BIA 1987), the BIA continued that trend by deemphasizing an
alien's manner of entry, a concept that had received so much emphasis in Matter of Salim, 18
I. & N. Dec. 311 (1982). See Anker, supra note 16, at 27.
336. Int. Dec. No. 2981 (BIA 1984).
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request for asylum but the immigration judge promptly disclaimed
any jurisdiction over the matter on the ground that the alien was not
entitled to a hearing, and therefore had no right to renew his asylum
request. 3
37
The BIA affirmed the immigration judge's decision that the alien
was not entitled to an exclusion hearing. Moreover, it held that the
INS had erred by putting the alien in exclusion proceedings before the
immigration judge, where the alien could renew his asylum request.
33 8
The BIA's position raised the question whether an alien's option to
renew his asylum plea in an exclusion or deportation hearing depends
upon his entitlement to that hearing in the first place, independent of
the asylum procedure. It was a good question and the Second Circuit
and the BIA parted company on this point. The Chun court felt that
an alien's right to asylum procedures was independent of his right to
exclusion or deportation hearings, meaning that stowaways had a
right to asylum hearings. 339 In contrast, the BIA in Waldei tied the
jurisdiction of the immigration judge in asylum cases to his jurisdic-
tion in exclusion cases. According to the BIA, a stowaway, not enti-
tled to a hearing before the judge in an exclusion proceeding, was not
entitled to one as part of the asylum procedure. 340 In short, the BIA
focused on and applied statutory provisions which restricted the
rights of stowaways, even though the stowaway in Matter of Waldei
was an asylum-seeker.
The same conflict arose again between the asylum provision and
another section of the INA in Azzouka v. Sava.341 This time the INS
regional commissioner summarily excluded the alien under section
235(c) 342 because the alien's activities were deemed to be "prejudicial
to the public interest, or [to] endanger the welfare, safety, or security
of the United States. ' 343 After the commissioner's ruling, the alien
337. Id. at 4-6.
338. Id. at 6.
339. Chun, 708 F.2d at 876.
340. Waldei, Int. Dec. No. 2981, at 6. The BIA was not interested in harmonizing the
various immigration provisions because it was convinced that Congress wanted to "address
and correct the growing serious problem that such stowaways and crewmen present." Id.
341. 777 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 830 (1986).
342. The Attorney General has the authority to exclude any alien without a hearing who
poses a threat to the security of the United States and the Attorney General can withhold any
confidential information on which he bases his decision if disclosure would be prejudicial to the
public interest. Immigration & Nationality Act § 235(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (1988). The At-
torney General's authority is exercised by the regional commissioner. 8 C.F.R. § 235.8 (1989).
343. Immigration & Nationality Act § 235(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (1988). There are 33
excludable classes. The class involved in Azzouka was comprised of "aliens who the consular
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filed a claim for asylum which the district director promptly denied
on the basis of the regional commissioner's finding of the alien's ex-
cludability. 344 However, the alien maintained that he was entitled to
an exclusion hearing before an immigration judge in accordance with
the asylum procedure. 345
The court distinguished Chun hy noting that the INA prohibits
asylum for security risks but not for stowaways. 346 The court was
unable to harmonize the asylum provisions with section 235(c) gov-
erning the summary exclusion of security risks the way that Chun had
reconciled those provisions with section 273(d). The court seemed
confident in its position that this alien should not have a hearing if the
regional commissioner had already branded him a security risk. The
court stated its position: "As an alien who is a threat to the national
security is disentitled to the substantive right of asylum, he is not enti-
tled to the asylum hearing. ' 347 However, the asylum procedures give
the alien the right to renew his asylum request in exclusion proceed-
ings before an immigration judge, even after the district director's
decision.
In Chun, the court did not apply procedural limitations "to the
extent and only to the extent that an asylum determination [was] in-
volved. '348 The Azzouka court held that any hearing should deal only
with the question whether the alien was a refugee and that his disqual-
ification under one of the exceptions should occur outside of the asy-
lum process.3 49 The Azzouka court thus supported the regional
commissioner's decision to place the alien in one of the exclusion cate-
gories, and in so doing made it pointless to have an asylum hearing for
one who had already been considered ineligible.
The Azzouka court further held that Congress did not intend to
amend by implication the summary exclusion provision for security
officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe seek to enter the United States
solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the
public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States." ld.
§ 212(a)(27), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27).
344. The district director based his decision on the regional commissioner's finding that
the alien was excludable under section 212(a)(27). He believed, therefore, that he had to deny
the asylum request because "there [were] reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a dan-
ger to the security of the United States," which is a basis recognized in the regulations. Az-
zouka, 777 F.2d at 73. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(1)(vi) (1989).
345. Azzouka, 777 F.2d at 70.
346. Azzouka v. Sava, 777 F.2d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 830 (1986).
347. Id. at 76.
348. Yiu Sing Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869, 875 (2d Cir. 1983).
349. Azzouka, 777 F.2d at 75.
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risks.350 It saw no inconsistency with Chun because it believed that
Congress intended to deny asylum to such security risks and not to
stowaways.
35'
Chun allowed the stowaway access to the asylum procedure be-
cause of the broad invitation of section 208. Arguably, the same invi-
tation should be available to an alien who may face exclusion because
of a security problem. The finding of a security problem will come
only after the alien has been subjected to the same scrutiny as any
other asylum applicant. Therefore, if the alien's status in Chun was
unrelated to his access to the asylum mechanism, then a consistent
application of section 208 would require the same treatment of any
other alien.
352
The regulations grant the regional commissioner the right to
make a determination about the alien's danger to security for the pur-
poses of summary exclusion under section 235(c). 353 However, the
asylum procedure does not give that same right to the regional com-
missioner. If the Azzouka court believed that the regional commis-
sioner should make that security determination, it offered no evidence
to substantiate the commissioner's jurisdiction in the asylum context.
Therefore, it is doubtful that the regional commissioner's findings
about the alien as a security risk should have ended the alien's quest
350. Id.
351. Azzouka v. Sava, 777 F.2d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 830 (1986).
The regional commissioner determined that the alien was excludable under section 212(a)(27)
because the alien would "engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest
or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States." Immigration & Nationality
Act § 212(a)(27), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(27) (1988). The regulation dealing with denial of asylum is
much more specific. It requires the district director to deny asylum if "[tihere are reasonable
grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the security of the United States." 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.8(f)(l)(vi) (1989). Therefore, the asylum procedure arguably contemplates a specific
determination of ineligibility for security reasons under the regulation and not under the
broader statutory provision that covers more than security cases. Although Congress intended
to deny asylum to security risks, it wanted to make sure that the judgment about the alien was
made only after the Attorney General had followed the appropriate procedure, regardless of
the alien's status. See Immigration & Nationality Act § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
352. The Azzouka court doubted that Congress "intended sub silentio to amend the stat-
utes regarding the summary exclusion of aliens threatening national security by providing a
new asylum hearing in which the security issue could be aimed." Azzouka, 777 F.2d at 75.
But in Chun, the Second Circuit dealt with a similar problem by granting a stowaway an
asylum hearing even though there was a provision for the summary exclusion of stowaways.
The Azzouka court rationalized its position on the basis that Congress wanted to keep out
security risks, but not stowaways. Id. Arguably, though, the judgment called for under the
exclusion statute, Immigration & Nationality Act § 212(a)(27), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (1988),
may be different from that under 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(1)(vi) (1989). See supra note 334.
353. 8 C.F.R. § 235.8(b) (1989).
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for an asylum hearing.354
In its defense, the BIA's approach in Matter of Waldei at least
promotes a consistency in the application of the asylum section by
tying the jurisdictional limitations of the particular exclusion provi-
sion to the requirements for asylum.35 If the alien is not entitled to
an exclusion proceeding when he originally applies for admission. he
is not eligible for a hearing during the asylum process. 356 Therefore,
the district director's denial of asylum confers no more rights on the
alien than he would have as a mere applicant for admission.
This is precisely what bothered Judge Friendly in Azzouka. He
agreed with the majority's conclusions in the case, but had some
doubts about reconciling the Chun decision. He sympathized with
the BIA's position in Waldei, but had difficulty distinguishing Chun
from Azzouka. 357 If aliens fell into categories which deprived them of
exclusion hearings, he felt it was incumbent on the court to explain
why the statute gave an asylum hearing in one case and not the
other.35 8 In Azzouka, the court attempted to relate the exclusion
ground to the asylum exception. The problem was that the exclusion
provision, section 212(a)(27), is much broader than the asylum excep-
tion.35 9 The court can exclude an alien for not only being dangerous
to the security of the United States, but also for engaging in activities
that would be "prejudicial to the public interest. ' ' 360 Hence, when the
district director relied on the regional commissioner's decision to ex-
clude the alien, he could not have understood the precise grounds.
354. Moreover, it is even unclear whether the regional commissioner must always make
the security determination. The regulation says that the district director must deny asylum "if
it is determined" that the alien is a danger to security. Id. The Azzouka court interpreted this
to mean that the regional commissioner should make the security determination. Azzouka,
777 F.2d at 76. This stretches the construction of the section a bit. Section 208.8 deals with
asylum decisions by the district director. If one follows the court's approach, then the district
director could rely on some other person to decide whether the alien is disqualified from relief
because the language "it is determined" covers not only aliens who are security risks, but other
categories of aliens that must be denied asylum.
355. Matter of Waldei, Int. Dec. No. 2981, at 5-6 (BIA 1984).
356. Id.
357. Azzouka v. Sava, 777 F.2d 68, 77 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 830 (1986)
(Friendly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
358. Id.
359. Compare Immigration & Nationality Act § 212(a)(27), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (1988),
excluding an alien for engaging in "activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest,
or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States," with 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.8(f)(1)(vi) (1989), requiring the district director to deny asylum when "[t]here are rea-
sonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the security of the United States."
360. Immigration & Nationality Act § 212(a)(27), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (1988).
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The regional commissioner might have relied on the other elements of
section 212(a)(27) that did not affect the country's security. There-
fore, there was perhaps an even stronger argument for denying an
asylum hearing in both Chun and Azzouka on the basis of the aliens'
ineligibility under the exclusion statutes.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that the Supreme Court settled some difficult
questions in Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca. The BIA and the circuits
were confused over the applicable standards and the Court resolved
the doubts decisively. However, the battles are now being waged in
the application of those standards. That is to be expected. However,
the BIA must make clear which standard it is applying in each case.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has properly demanded that BIA assess
the aliens' claims under particular standards instead of allowing the
BIA to conclude generally that the alien has failed regardless of which
test is applied.
For many aliens, asylum or relief from deportation is the last
hope. This is why every effort should be made to remove the statu-
tory ambiguities which threaten an alien's eligibility for relief. Room
for clarification exists in section 243(h)(2)(B) because an alien's con-
viction for a particularly serious crime is not conclusive of his danger
to the United States community. If an alien's conviction was conclu-
sive on the issue of dangerousness, Congress unnecessarily drafted
language regarding the alien's threat to the community because the
alien's conviction itself would satisfy congressional concern.
Assuming an alien's conviction automatically makes the alien a
threat to the community, one would still have to ask whether that
threat is permanent. This inquiry would follow, considering the stat-
ute calls for the Attorney General's present determination of the
alien's dangerousness. 361 Therefore, even if the alien was convicted
long ago, the Attorney General must still determine whether the con-
viction makes the alien a present danger to the community. It is no
small wonder that Congress requires the Attorney General to make
that judgment. Th statute seeks to tie the conviction to the alien's
present threat to society. Conceivably, if convictions were determina-
361. The Attorney General cannot withhold the alien's deportation if he determines that
the convicted alien "constitutes a danger to the community." Id. § 243(h)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h)(2)(B) (1988) (emphasis added). This calls for a present assessment unless one ac-
cepts that a conviction brands the alien for life as a dangerous person.
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tive, then an alien's conduct fifty years ago would make him a danger
today. In such a case, the Attorney General's determination would
have nothing to do with the current propensities of the alien. Con-
gress would hardly have intended the conviction itself to have such an
effect if the alien's life was in grave danger. 362 Moreover, there would
be no utility in the "danger to the community" language once the
alien haq co m itted a "p-nrtic ,arly serious crime" Tt is ti-e thr
fore, for something to be done about this language. If the alien's con-
viction is sufficient to deny relief, then the statute should be amended
to deny relief on the basis of the conviction only. On the other hand,
the two-step process could be clearly required by a finding of an
alien's conviction and a finding of dangerousness to the commu-
nity. 363 There would be little doubt about congressional intent in that
statutory language.
As far as the discretionary element in asylum is concerned, one
can only hope that the BIA will abandon its fixation on the alien's
manner of entry. The BIA's position in Pula that asylum should be
granted "[i]n the absence of any adverse factors" is encouraging. 364
But that encouragement is short-lived when one realizes that the en-
try question arises in so many asylum cases. The BIA must pay more
attention to the protection element of asylum rather than the issue of
orderly immigration procedures.
365
Unfortunately, a court may deny relief to an alien whose well-
founded fear of persecution qualifies him as a refugee if he is unable to
meet the higher standard of section 243(h). 36 6 The alien may then be
362. Congress based the withholding provision, section 243(h), on the language of the
Protocol and intended that they be construed consistently. S. REP. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 19 (1980). In discussing this provision, one commentator said that "[tihe offence in ques-
tion and the perceived threat to the community would need to be extremely grave if danger to
the life of the refugee were to be disregarded... G. GOODWILL-GILL, supra note 45, at 96.
It is therefore important to know whether the alien was or is dangerous.
363. Immigration & Nationality Act § 243(h)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B), should be
amended to provide for denial of withholding, and 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(1)(iv) should be
amended to provide for denial of asylum, if the alien who has been convicted of a particularly
serious crime constitutes a danger to the community of the United States.
364. Matter of Pula, Int. Dec. No. 3033, at 10 (BIA 1987) (emphasis added).
365. See Anker, supra note 16, at 71. The objection to this may be that some consideration
must be given to the fact that the alien has jumped the queue of aliens waiting to enter. But
this is not held against the alien in other contexts, and it should hardly be held so in asylum
situations. See, e.g., Immigration & Nationality Act §§ 244(a), 245A, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1254(a),
1255a (1988).
366. See T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 11, at 79 (Supp. 1987); D. MARTIN,
supra note 16, at 82; Helton, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca; The Decision and its Implications, 16
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 35, 53 (1987-88).
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facing the prospect of persecution, uncertain as it may be. This is
why, as a matter of principle, the BIA should deny asylum only on
account of genuine compelling factors which justify sending the alien
back where he may face "a threat of imminent danger to his life or
liberty. ' 367 It is important that some prescription exist for the exer-
cise of discretion in asylum adjudications. In this respect, Matter of
Pula and Matter of Soleimani are steps in the right direction.
Although the Supreme Court recognized in Cardoza-Fonseca that
courts will not grant asylum to all aliens qualifying as refugees,
368
courts should not turn asylum applicants away on the slightest pre-
text. The alien in Matter of Salim was fortunate. He was denied asy-
lum, but his deportation was withheld because he met the higher
standard of section 243(h). At least he managed to avoid the clutches
of his persecutors. An alien who possesses genuine fear but cannot
meet the higher standard should still have a chance at asylum.
367. See Hemandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 519 (9th Cir. 1985); Helton, supra note
366, at 53.
368. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 443 (1987).
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